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S 

University  of  California  •  Berkeley 


COMPANY    A, 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS    r          V., 


1846-'48, 


MEXICAN    WAR. 


GUSTAVUS    W.   SMITH. 

\A->T    OF    KXC! 
4 

3     AKMY. 


.        '    •    . 

is  6  . 


COMPANY    'A, 


CORPS  OF  ENGINEERS,  U.  S.  A., 


IN     THE 


MEXICAN   WAR 


BY 


GUSTAVUS    W.    SMITH, 


FORMERLY    LIEUTENANT   OF    ENGINEERS,   AND    BYT.   CAPTAIN, 


U.     8.     ARMY. 


THE   BATTALION   PRESS, 

1896. 


PREFACE. 


Executive  Document,  No  1,  United  States  Senate,  December 
7,  1847,  contains  a  Communication  from  the  Secretary  of  War, 
transmitting  to  Congress  the  official  reports  of  commanding  gen 
erals  and  their  subordinates  in  the  Mexican  War. 

The  Secretary  says:  "The  company  of  engineer  soldiers, 
authorized  by  the  act  of  May  15,  1846,  has  been  more  than  a  year 
on  active  duty  in  Mexico,  and  has  rendered  efficient  service.  I 
again  submit,  with  approval,  the  proposition  of  the  Chief  Engineer 
for  an  increase  of  this  description  of  force."  (  Senate-Ex.  Doc. 
No.  1,  1847,  p.  07.) 


(3) 


\iiM\SlJ    V  nO  S 


BUT 


TABLE  OF    CONTENTS. 

Page 

PREFACE.                                                                                        -  3 
CHAP.    I. — Enlistment — Instruction — Detention    on    the    Rio 
Grande — March  to  Victoria  and  Tarn  pi  co — Land 
ing  at  Vera  Cruz — Death  of  Captain  Swift.  7 
'      II. — Engaged  in  Operations  against  Vera  Cruz.              -  21 
"     III. — After  the  Surrender  of  Vera  Cruz  to  the  Occupa 
tion  of  Puebla.  28 
"     IV.— From  Puebla  to  Churubusco.  34 
"      V.— Capture  of  the  City  of  Mexico.  48 
"     VI.— In  the  City  of  Mexico;  Return  to  West  Point.  57 
APPENDIX  A. ^—  Brief  Extracts,  from  Wilcox's  History  of  the 

Mexican  War,  1892.  66 

"       i    B. — Promotions  of  Enlisted  Men  of  the  Company.  69 


(5) 


CHAPTER  I. 

ENLISTMENT— INSTRUCTION— DETENTION  ON  THE  RIO  GRANDE— MARCH 

TO  VICTORIA  AND  TAMPICO— LANDING  AT  VERA  CRUZ— DEATH 

OF  CAPTAIN  SWIFT. 


Previous  to  the  war  with  Mexico  there  existed  among  the 
people  of  the  United  States  a  strong  prejudice  against  maintain 
ing  even  a  small  regular  army  in  time  of  peace.  Active  opposition 
to  a  permanent,  regular  military  establishment  extended  to  the 
West  Point  Academy,  in  which  cadets  were  trained  and  qualified 
to  become  commissioned  officers  of  the  army.  That  Academy  was 
then  a  component  part  of  the  Military  Engineer  Corps.  For  years 
the  chief  of  the  Corps  had,  in  vain,  urged  upon  Congress,  the  neces 
sity  for  having,  at  least  one  company  of  enlisted  engineer  soldiers 
as  a  part  of  the  regular  army. 

In  the  meantime  he  had,  however,  succeeded  in  persuading  the 
Government  at  Washington  to  send — by  permission  of  the  Govern 
ment  of  France— a  selected  Captain  of  the  U.  S.  Engineer  Corps 
to  the  French  School  of  engineer  officers  at  Metz ;  for  the  purpose 
of  having  in  the  U.  S.  Army,  an  officer  qualified  to  instruct  and 
command  a  company  of  engineer  soldiers  in  case  Congress  could 
be  induced  to  authorize  the  enlistment  of  such  a  company. 

Captain  Alexander  J.  Swift  was  the  officor  selected  to  be  sent  to 
Metz.  On  his  return  to  the  United  States,  ho  was  assigned  to  tem 
porary  duty  at  West  Point  awaiting  the  long  delayed  passage  of  an 
act  authorizing  the  enlistment  of  a  company  of  U.  S.  Engineer 
soldiers. 

That  act  was  passed  soon  after  the  commencement  of  hostilities 
with  Mexico.  It  provided  for  the  enlistment  of  an  engineer 
company  of  100  men,  in  the  regular  aimy.  The  company  to  be 
composed  of  10  sergeants,  10  corporals,  3(.)  artificers,  39  second  class 
privates,  and  2  musicians;  all  with  higher  pay  than  that  of  enlisted 
men  in  the  line  of  the  army. 

Captain  Swift  was  assigned  to  the  command;  and,  at  his  request, 
I  was  ordered  to  report  to  him  as  next  officer  in  rank  to  himself. 
At  my  suggestion,  Brevet  Second  Lieutenant  George  B.  McClellan, 
who  had  just  been  graduated  from  the  Military  Academy,  was 
assigned  as  junior  officer  of  the  company. 

(7) 


At  that  time  I  had  been  an  officer  of  engineers  for  four  years ; 
my  rank  was  that  of  second  lieutenant.  All  the  first  lieutenants, 
and  some  of  the  socond  lien  tenants,  of  that  corps,  were  then  in  sole 
charge  of  the  construction  of  separate  fortifications,  or  were  en 
gaged  in  other  important  duties.  Captain  Swift  was  not  disposed 
to  apply  for  the  assignment  of  any  of  those  officers  to  be  subalterns 
under  him  in  a  company  of  soldiers. 

I  had  taught  McClellan  during  his  last  year  in  the  Academy, 
and  felt  assured  that  lie  would  be  in  full  harmony  with  me  in  the 
duties  we  would  be  called  upon  to  perform  under  Captain  Swift. 
It  is  safe  to  say  that  no  three  officers  of  a  company  of  soldiers  ever 
worked  together  with  less  friction.  The  understanding  between  them 
was  complete.  There  were  no  jars — no  doubts  or  cross  purposes — 
and  no  conflict  of  opinion  or  of  action. 

In  the  beginning  f  was  charged  with  the  instruction  of  the 
company  as  an  infantry  command,  whilst  the  Captain  took  control 
of  the  recruiting,  the  collection  of  engineer  implements — including 
an  India  Rubber  Ponton  Bridge— and  he  privately  instructed 
McClellan  and  myself,  at  his  own  house,  in  the  rudiments  of 
practical  military  engineering  which  he  had  acquired  at  Mctz.  In 
the  meantime  we  taught  him,  at  the  same  place,  the  manual  of 
arms  and  Infantry  tactics  which  had  been  introduced  into  the  army 
after  he  was  graduated  at  the  Military  Academy.  In  practical 
engineer  drills  the  Captain  was  always  in  control. 

After  the  men  were  j.-assably  well  drilled  in  the  "  Infantry  School 
of  the  Company";  the  time  had  come  for  him  to  take  executive 
command  on  the  infantry  drill  ground.  lie  did  this  on  the  first 
occasion,  like  a  veteran  Captain  of  Infantry  until  "a  rest"  was 
ordered. 

Whilst  the  men  were  "at  rest",  McClellan  and  myself  quietly, 
but  earnestly,  congratulated  him  upon  his  successful  debut  as  drill 
officer  of  an  Infantry  Company.  lie  kindly  attributed  to  our  in 
struction  in  his  house,  whatever  proficiency  he  had  acquired  in  the 
new  tactics  which  had  then  been  recently  introduced. 

But,  after  the  company  was  again  called  to  "Attention"  and 
the  drill  was  progressing,  whilst  marching  with  full  company 
front  across  the  plain,  the  men  all  well  in  line,  to  my  surprise  the 
Captain  ordered  "  faster'',  and  added  "the  step  is  much  too  slow  ". 
Of  course  we  went  "  faster  ".  In  a  short  time  the  Captain  ordered 
"faster  still,  the  step  is  very  much  too  slow".  This  order  was 
several  times  repeated,  and  before  the  drill  ended  we  were  virtually 
"  at  a  run  ". 

After  the  drill  was  over  and  the  Company  dismissed  from  the 


parade  ground,  I  asked  the  Captain  why  he  had  not-  given  the 
commands  "quick  time"  and  "double  quick",  instead  of  saying 
"  faster "  and  "still  faster".  He  said  he  did  not  intend  the  step 
should  be  "  quick  time" — much  less  "  double  quick".  He  only 
wanted  the  rate  to  be  in  "common  time — 90  steps  a  minute"; 
and  added:  "you  had  not  reached  that  rate  when  the  drill  ended  ". 

I  insisted  that  he  must  be  mistaken,  and  told  him  we  were 
marching  in  "common  time"  or  very  near  it,  when  he  first  gave 
the  order,  "faster".  He  persisted  that  he  was  right  in  regard 
to  the  rate  of  the  step— said  "that  he  had  carefully  counted  it, 
watch  in  hand";  and  added:  "You  were,  at  the  last,  not  making 
more  than  85  steps  to  the  minute".  I  was  satisfied  that  he  was 
mistaken;  but  he  relied  implicitly  upon  the  correctness  of  his 
count  and  the  accuracy  of  his  watch. 

McClellan  and  I  proceeded  to  the  company  quarters,  of  which  I 
still  had  charge.  On  the  way  we  referred  to  the  matter  of  the 
step,  and  both  of  us  were  at  a  loss  to  account  for  the  misappre 
hension  we  were  sure  the  Captain  labored  under  in  regard  to  it. 

I  asked  McClellan  to  take  out  his  watch  and  count  whilst  I 
marched  in  "common  time".  I  made  DO  steps  per  minute-- and 
repeated  it  more  than  once.  It  presently  dawned  upon  us  that  our 
Captain,  whilst  consulting  his  watch,  had  counted  only  one  foot  in 
getting  at  the  number  of  steps:  and  that  we  were  really  making 
170  steps  to  the  minute  when  he  counted  So.  The  mystery  was 
solved,  the  Captain  had  counted  "the  left  foot"  only. 

When  we  next  went  to  his  housa  for  instruction  in  details  of  tho 
school  of  the  engineer  soldier,  I  asked  him  how  many  steps  we  were 
making  a  minute  when  he  first  ordered  "faster".  He  said  "about 
45".  I  replied:  "That's  it.  We  have  found  out  what  was  the 
matter.  You  counted  only  the  left  foot.  We  were  marching  in 
'common  time'  when  you  ordered  us  to  move  *  faster ';  and  you 
pushed  us  to  nearly  twice  that  rate  ". 

"  The  cat  was  out  of  the  bag."  The  Captain  saw  it  at  once  and 
laughed  heartily  over  the  error  he  had  fallen  into  in  the  latter  part 
of  his  "first  appearance"  as  captain,  in  drilling  the  company  as 
infantry.  He  made  no  such  mistake  thereafter;  and  the  men 
never  knew  of  his  "count",  watch  in  hand. 

On  the  26th  of  September,  1840,  we  sailed  from  New  York,  71 
rank  and  file,  for  Brazos  Santiago,  under  orders  to  report  to  General 
Taylor,  commanding  the  U.  S.  army  in  Mexico.  We  landed  at 
Brazos  on  the  li-tli  of  October,  remained  at  that  point  for  several 
days,  proceeded  thence  to  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande  and 
arrived  at  Camargo  on  the  2nd  of  November.  There  the  company 


10 

was  delayed  for  several  weeks  because  transportation  for  the  en 
gineer  train  to  the  headquarters  of  the  Army  at  Monterey,  was  not 
then  available. 

The  Company  left  Carmargo  for  Brazos,  on  the  29th  of  Novem 
ber,  under  orders  to  proceed  to  Tampico  by  sea,  but  was  ordered 
to  return  to  Matamoros  with  a  portion  of  its  tools,  and  march,  via 
Victoria,  to  Tampico— the  bulk  of  its  train  to  be  transported  to  the 
latter  place  by  water. 

Whilst  detained  at  Camargo  instruction  in  the  school  of  the 
engineer  soldier  was  kept  up,  and  infantry  drills  were  constantly 
practiced.  During  that  time  several  thousand  troops  were  in  camp 
near  Camargo,  and  the  men  of  the  engineer  company  learned  that 
they  were,  by  the  line  of  the  army,  styled  :  "  the  pick  and  shovel 
brigade".  Their  officers  advised  them  not  to  care  for  this  epithet 
but,  "  take  it  easy,  continue  to  endeavor  to  become  model  infantry, 
and  engraft  on  that  a  fair  knowledge  of  the  duties  of  the  engineer 
soldier''.  They  were  assured  that  "for  heavy  work'',  details  would 
have  to  be  made  from  the  line  of  the  army  ;  and  these  details 
would,  for  the  time,  constitute  the  real  "  pick  and  shovel  brigade  " 
under  the  control  of  engineer  officers,  assisted  by  trained  engineer 
soldiers.  When  the  time  came  for  close  fighting  the  engineer 
company  would  bo  at  the  front. 

The  troops  stationed  on  the  Rio  Grande  during  the  fall  of  1846, 
suffered  greatly  from  Mexican  diarrhoea,  fevers  and  other  diseases. 
Several  men  of  the  engineer  company  died,  and  Captain  Swift 
and  twenty  of  the  men  were  left  in  hospital  at  Matamoros,  when 
the  company  finally  left  the  latter  place. 

Before  giving  an  account  of  our  first  march  in  the  enemy's  coun 
try,  it  may  be  well  to  state  here,  that  with  two  exceptions,  the 
enlisted  men  of  the  engineer  company  were  native  born,  and  all 
but  four  of  them  were  raw  recruits.  Kach  of  these  four  had  served, 
with  credit,  during  one  or  more  terms  of  enlistment  in  the  regular 
army.  Three  of  them  were  promptly  made  sergeants,  and  the 
fourth  was  a  musician  (bugler). 

All  of  the  recruits  but  one,  were  very  carefully  selected  material, 
out  of  which  to  form,  as  soon  as  practicable,  skilled  engineer  soldiers. 
The  one  exception  was  a  short,  fat,  dumpy,  Long  Island  Dutch 
man — a  good  cook,  specially  enlisted  by  Captain  Swift  to  cook  for 
the  men.  lie  was  given  the  pay  and  rank  of  artificer  of  engineers. 
The  men  looked  upon  him  more  as  a  servant  of  theirs  than  as  a 
fellow  soldier.  He  was  well  satisfied  with  his  position,  prided 
himself  on  his  special  duties,  rather  looked  down  upon  ''soldiers" 
— and  was  impudent  by  nature. 


11 

All  went  well  enough  with  the  "  cook  "  until  he  was  required  to 
take  his  place  in  the  ranks,  at  regular  bi-montly  "  muster,  and 
inspection  "  for  pay.  His  performance  on  that  occasion  was  so 
grotesquely  awkward  that  I  directed  he  should  be  put  through  the 
"squad-drill  "  by  one  of  the  sergeants,  who  was  a  thoroughly  com 
petent,  but  rather  severe,  drill-master. 

The  "cook"  felt  that  his  rights  were  invaded,  in  requiring  him 
to.  submit  to  be  drilled.  The  sergeant  made  no  progress  in  teacht 
ing  him.  After  three  days'  trial,  he  reported  to  me  that  he  was 
mortified,  and  ashamed,  to  have  to  admit  he  could  do  nothing 
with  "that  cook'';  and  he  asked  to  be  relieved  from  the  duty  of 
drilling  him.  In  reply  to  my  question :  "Can't  you  make  him 
obey  you?''  He  replied  :  "  No — the  only  thing  I  can  do  is  to  kill 
him  ";  and  added :  "  When  that  kind  of  thing  has  to  be  done,  in 
this  company,  my  understanding  is,  the  lieutenant  in  command 
is  the  only  one  who  has  the  right  to  kill ". 

I  relieved  the  sergeant,  and  told  him  I  would  take  the  "  cook  " 
in  hand  at  the  next  drill.  On  the  following  day,  I  marched  him 
off'  into  the  dense  chapparel,  on  the  bottom  lands  near  Matamoros. 
After  following  obscure  paths,  about  three  miles  in  their  windings 
through  the  jungle,  I  halted  him  in  a  small  open  space  a  few 
hundred  yards  from  the  company  camp.  He  thought  no  doubt, 
we  were  live  miles  from  camp — in  a  boundless  wilderness — whilst, 
in  fact,  we  were  at  no  time  five  hundred  yards  away. 

I  told  him  of  the  report  that  had  been  made  to  me  of  his  dis 
obedience,  informed  him  that  I  had  brought  him  into  the  chap 
parel  for  the  purpose  of  compelling  him  to  obey  me;  called  his 
attention  to  the  fact  that  we  were  in  the  enemy's  country  in  time 
of  war;  all  of  our  lives  were  in  peril,  and  that  persistent  dis 
obedience  on  the  part  of  any  officer  or  soldier  to  the  legal  authority 
of  those  over  him,  was  punishable  with  death  ;  that  I  did  not 
propose  to  place  him  before  a  Court  Martial;  but,  would  kill  him, if 
he  did  not  implicitly  obey  an  order  I  proposed  then  and  there  to 
give  him. 

I  measured  15  paces  in  front  of  him  and  placed  a  small  white 
chip  on  the  ground,  called  him  to  "  attention ",  ordered  him  to 
place  his  eyes  on  that  chip,  and  told  him  if  he  removed  them  from 
it  before  I  gave  the  command  "rest",  I  would  run  him  through 
with  my  rapier. 

I  then  drilled  him  at  the  manual  of  arms  for  about  20  minutes. 
Large  beads  of  perspiration  rolled  down  his  face — he  began  to  totter 
on  his  feet — and  I  gave  the  command  "rest".  He  had  not  taken 
his  eyes  from  the  chip. 


12 

At  the  command  "rest",  he  drew  a  long  sigh  of  relief  and  uttered 
a  subdued  but  prolonged  "  0-h  ".  I  asked  him  if  he  now  thought 
he  could  obey  the  sergeant.  He  replied:  "Yes,  I  will  obey 
anybody  ". 

I  told  him  I  would  temporarily  withdraw  what  I  had  said  about 

killing  him,  and  would  put  him  on  his  good  behavior.      I  drilled 

him  about  two  hours  longer;  and  then  took  him,  by  a  circuitous 

f route,  through  the  jungle,  back  to  camp.    lie  was  obedient  enough 

thereafter. 

When  the  war  had  ended  and  I  was  relieved  from  duty  with  the 
company,  one  of  the  men  told  me  that  "  the  cook",  on  his  return 
from  the  drill  I  had  given  him  said:  "The  Lieutenant  took  me 
way  off,  ever  so  far,  in  the  chapparal,  and  told  me  he  took  me  there 
to  kill  me  if  I  didn't  mind  him.  The  little  devil  meant  it,  and 
would  have  done  it  too,  if  I  had  fooled  with  him  like  I  had  done 
with  the  sergeant.'' 

Except  thi. -3  case,  of  "the  cook  ",  there  had  been  no  difficulty  in 
bringing  the  men  of  the  company  to  a  high  standard  of  drill  and 
discipline  as  an  infantry  company,  an-.l  a  reasonable  degree  of  pro 
ficiency  in  the  school  of  the  engineer  soldier.  But,  on  their  first 
march  into  the  enemy's  country,  they  were  called  upon  to  do  an 
immense  amount  of  hard  work  not  specially  referrred  to  in  their 
preliminary  instruction. 

THE  MARCH   FROM   MATAMOROS   TO  VICTORIA   AND  TAMPICO. 


By  special  orders  from  General  Taylor,  brought  by  Major  George 
A.  McCall  to  Captain  Swift,  the  latter  was  charged  with  the  duty 
of  repairing  the  road  from  Matamoros  to  Victoria,  and  making  it 
practicable  for  artillery  and  the  baggage  train;  and  to  do  this,  if 
possible,  so  that  the  whole  command  might  make  its  proscribed 
daily  marches  and  arrive  at  Victoria  on  a  named  day.  Captain 
Swift  was  authorized  to  call  upon  the  commander  of  the  forces, 
on  this  march,  for  such  assistance  as  might  be  needed  to  perform 
the  work;  and  was  directed  to  do  no  more  to  the  road  than  was 
barely  sufficient  to  enable  the  trains  to  pass  over  it.  It  was  not 
expected  that  we  would  ever  have  occasion  to  pass  through  that 
region  again;  and  it  was  not  proposed  to  mako  a  permanent  road 
for  the  benefit  of  Mexicans. 

Captain  Swift  being  sick  in  hospital,  the  foregoing  instructions 
were  given  to  me,  as  Commander  of  the  company,  by  Major  McCall, 
who,  in  the  capacity  of  Adjutant-General  of  the  forces  under 
General  Patterson,  accompanied  him  on  this  march. 


13 

Under  orders  from  General  Taylor,  the  company  oT  engineers, 
reduced  to  two  officers  and  forty-five  enlisted  men  for  service, 
marched  from  Matamoros  on  the  21st  of  December,  1846,  with  a 
column  of  volunteers  under  General  Patterson,  to  join  General 
Taylor's  army  at  Victoria.  We  arrived  at  the  latter  place  on  the 
4th  of  January,  1847.  A  great  deal  of  work  had  been  done  by 
details  of  volunteers  and  the  engineer  company  in  making  the 
road  practicable  for  artillery  and  baggige  wagons.  Without  dwell 
ing  upon  daily  operations,  the  folio  wirg  statement  of  the  manner 
in  which  we  made  our  way  across  a  difficult  stream  may  be  of 
interest. 

About  noon  one  day  I  was  informed  by  Major  McCall,  who  had 
ridden  ahead  of  the  working  party,  that  there  was  an  exceedingly 
difficult  "river-crossing"  about  one  mile  in  front,  and  that  he  feared 
we  would  be  detained  there  for,  perhaps,  two  days.  I  galloped 
forward  to  the  place  designated.  It  looked  ugly.  The  banks  of 
the  stream  were  something  more  than  100  feet  high  and  quite  steep. 
Guiding  my  horse  down  to  the  water's  edge,  I  crossed  the  river 
which  was  from  two  to  three  feet  deep,  and  about  cne  hundred 
yards  wido.  The  bottom  was  fair  enough,  until  within  a  few  yards 
of  the  opposite  shore,  where  it  was  soft  mud.  Getting  through  this 
with  some  difficulty  I  rode  to  the  top  of  the  bank  on  the  far  side. 

To  make  an  ordinary  practicable  road  across  that  stream  would 
require  two  or  three  day's  work  of  several  .hundred  men.  It  seemed 
a  clear  case  for  the  free  use  of  drag-ropes  to  let  the  wagons  down 
into  the  stream  on  the  near  side,  and  haul  them  up  the  opposite 
bank. 

It  was  plain  to  me  that  with  a  working  party  of  two  hundred 
men — -which  was  the  greatest  number  we  could  supply  with  tools-*- 
a  straight  steep  ramp  could  be  cut  on  both  banks  in  six  or  eight 
hours  hard  work.  The  greatest  difficulty  would  bo  encountered  in 
getting  out  of  the  stream  on  the  far  side. 

Returning  quickly  to  whera  I  had  left  Major  McCall,  I  asked  him 
to  give  mo  a  working  party  of  about  800  men,  told  him  I  would 
find  use  for  that  number  and  that  in  my  opinion,  with  that  force, 
the  wagon  train  could  be  put  across  the  stream  before  dark.  The 
commanding  General  thought  my  requisition  for  the  working  de 
tail  was  extra vagent,  a3  we  scarcjly  had  tools  enough  for  a  quarter 
of  that  number  of  men.  But  the  detail  was  ordered,  as  called  for, 
to  report  to  mo.  In  the  meantime  the  engineer  company  and  its 
train  was  taken  to  the  crossing,  and  the  character  of  the  work  to  be 
done  there  was  explained  to  the  men. 


14 

Leaving  Lieutenant  McClellan  with  a  portion  of  the  company  to 
take  charge  of  the  near  bank,  directing  him  to  halt  there  about  300 
of  the  working  party  and  send  about  500  to  me  on  the  opposite 
bank,  I  crossed  the  stream  with  the  rest  of  the  company  and  ex 
plained  to  them  the  work  to  be  done  on  that  side,  particularly  the 
means  to  be  used  in  getting  out  of  the  river.  On  each  side  of  the 
stream  the  working  party  was  divided  into  three  "reliefs"',  or 
relays — with  one  hundred  men  or  more  held  in  reserve,  to  meet 
contingencies. 

The  working  party  arrived  in  good  season,  tools  were  promptly 
distributed  to  the  first  "  relief"  on  each  side  of  the  river,  and  the 
men  were  told  that,  if  they  would  work  as  at  a  "  corn-shucking- 
match  ",  or  as  if  the  "  house  was  on  fire",  they  would  be  let  off'  in 
an  hour,  or  less,  depending  on  the  rapidity  and  effectiveness  of 
their  work.  It  was  to  be  a  race  against  time.  I  wanted  all  the 
work  there  was  in  them,  and  wanted  it  inside  of  an  hour. 

Before  the  hour  was  up  the  "first  relief"  on  each  side  of  the 
river,  was  ordered  to  stop  work,  drop  their  tools,  get  out  of  the  road 
and  take  to  the  bushes.  The  "second  relief"  was  immediately 
marched  into  the  vacated  places,  seized  the  tools,  and  worked  like 
the  first— and  on  the  same  conditions.  So  with  the  "third  relief"; 
and,  inside  of  three  hours  from  the  time  the  work  began,  the 
engineer  wagons  were  crossing  the  river.  They  soon  moved  on, 
leaving  the  rest  of  the  forces  to  follow  at  their  leisure. 

The  volunteer  officers  afterwards  complained  to  me  that  the 
"  wild  work  "  on  the  banks  of  that  river,  had  "scattered  "their  men 
so  badly,  it  was  several  days  before  they  could  be  again  got  into 
their  proper  places. 

This  case  was  an  exception — a  frolic.  The  usual  daily  work  on 
the  road  was  more  regular  and  continuous,  without  disorder. 

It  may  perhaps  not  be  out  of  place  here  to  mention,  that  about 
the  time  I  sent  the  "  first  relief"  into  the  bushes,  and  set  the 
"second  relief"  to  work  under  the  directions  of  men  of  the 
engineer  company,  the  commander  of  the  forces,  with  his  staff, 
arrived  on  the  bank  where  McClellan  was  in  charge,  and  asked  for 
me.  He  was  told  that  I  was  on  the  opposite  bank.  Just  at  that 
time  the  confusion  and  wild  yells  of  the  "first  relief"  and  the 
loud  cheers  of  the  "second  relief"  when  told  that  they,  too,  would 
be  let  off  inside  of  an  hour,  provided  they  would  work  as  if  engaged 
in  a  "  corn-shucking  match  ",  astounded  the  general,  and  had  to 
him  the  appearance  of  disorder,  perhaps  mutiny. 

On  asking  Lieutenant  McClellan  what  it  meant,  the  latter  re 
plied:  "It  is  all  right;  Lieutenant  Smith  has  the  larger  portion  of 


15 

the  engineer  company  with  him  on  that  bank;  and  I  can  sec  him, 
and  men  of  tiie  company  near  him  in  the  road,  all  of  whom  seem 
to  be  quietly  giving  instructions  to  the  new  working  party*'. 

After  starting  the  "second  relief"  to  digging  in  the  road,  I  had 
gone  to  the  bmw  of  the  bank  overlooking  the  work  which  was 
being  done,  mostly  by  my  own  men  in  the  river,  where  the  road 
was  to  leave  it.  The  engineer  sergeant  in  charge  of  that  work  in 
formed  me  that  he  was  then  in  immediate  need  of  about  twenty 
additional  men.  The  reserve  working  force  was  not  far  from  me. 
I  called  out  for  a  sergeant  anJ  twenty  men.  without  arms  or  ac 
coutrements,  to  como  to  me.  Pointing  to  the  river,  just  under  the 
pi .103  at  which  I  was  standing,  I  directed  the  sergeant  of  this 
reserve  party  to  take  his  men  down  at  once  and  report  to  the  en 
gineer  sargaant  in  charge  thare.  The  bank  was  precipitous.  The 
sergaant  of  the  reserve  working  party  said  that  he  would  take  his 
men  back  about  one  hundred  yards,  and  go  down  by  the  roaJ  on 
which  the  "second  relief"  was  working.  I  demurred,  and  told 
him  again,  to  take  his  men  straight  to  where  they  were  needed, 
lie  still  hesitated.  I  pushed  him  over  the  brow  of  the  bank,  and 
he  went  headlong  into  the  river.  I  then  ordered  his  men  to  follow 
him.  They  di  1  it  with  a  cheer  and  regular  "  Comanche-whoop"- 
sliding  down  tha  slope,  which  was  too  steep  to  stand  on. 

This  sc3iie,  too,  was  witnessed  from  across  the  river  by  the  Gen 
eral  of  tha  forces  and  1  vis  staff.  I  did  not  know  th 03  were  there; 
but  if  I  had.  it  would  have  made  no  difference;  I  was  in  charge 
of  the  woiking  party,  rnd  in  haste  to  finish  that  special  job. 

On  our  arrival  at  Victoria,  the  company  was  relieved  from  duty 
under  General  Patterson,  and  I  was  directed  to  report  to  the  head 
quarters  of  General  Taylor.  On  the  12th  of  January  the  company 
was  ordered  to  report  to  General  Twiggs.  With  two  companies  of 
the  line  to  furnish  additional  details  for  labor  when  required  I  was 
charged  v::th  the  duty  of  making  the  road  between  Victoria  and 
Tampico  practicable  for  wagons.  These  three  companies  left  Vic 
toria  on  the  13th. 

The  following  extracts  from  my  official  report  of  the  operations 
of  the  Engineer  Company  for  tha  month  of  January,  1847,  illus 
trate,  in  part,  the  difficulties  met  with. 

"The  first  day,  (out  from  Victoria,)  we  had  three  bad  boggy 
brooks  to  cross;  besides  a  great  deal  of  cutting  to  do  with  axes  in 
order  to  open  the  road  ;  and  many  bad  ravines  and  gullies  to 
render  passable.  To  make  a  bridge,  across  a  boggy  stream,  with 
no  other  material  than  the  short,  knotty,  hard  and  crooked  chap- 
paral  bush,  was  no  easy  matter.  The  first  day's  march  was  about 


16 

ten  miles — we  encamped  about  sunset  after  a  very  hard  day's 
work." 

In  order  to  shorten  the  route  and  save  the  forces  one  day's 
march,  we  were,  for  several  days,  working  on  a  mule  path  "cut-off" 
from  the  main  road. 

"January  14th.  The  mule  path  was  infamous.  No  wagon  had 
ever  traveled  that  road — the  rancheros  have  a  tradition  of  a  bull 
cart  that,  it  is  said,  once  passed  that  way.  I  believe,  however,  that 
the  story  is  not  credited.  We  worked  from  dawn  of  day  until  dark 
and  encamped  about  six  miles  from  where  we  started  in  the 
morning  and  about  the  same  distance  from  the  camp  we  wished 
to  reach  that  day." 

"  January  loth.      Another  day's  tremendous  hard  work." 

"  January  16th.      We  had  again  a  very  severe  day's  work." 

"January  17th.  Road  improved  very  decidedly,  but  still  a 
good  deal  to  do.  We  managed,  by  getting  a  little  ahead  with  our 
repairs  after  the  army  encamped  for  the  night,  to  get  along  without 
seriously  delaying  the  column." 

We  arrived  at  Tampico  on  the  23rd.  The  distance  from  Victoria 
to  Tampico  is  120  miles;  whole  distance  from  Matamoros  to  Tam 
pico,  by  way  of  Victoria,  is  354  miles. 

Although  the  service  was  arduous,  the  men  came  through  it  in 
good  health,  and  were  all  the  better  soldiers  for  the  practical  schooling 
acquired  in  that  350  miles  of  road  making.  After  this  experience, 
ordinary  marches  and  drills  were  to  them,  very  light  matters. 

TAMPICO   TO   VERA   CRUZ. 

From  Tampico  we  sailed  for  Lobos  Island  and  Vera  Cruz,  on  a 
small  schooner,  the  Captain  of  which  was  a  brave  little  Frenchman, 
who  was  not  acquainted  with  the  Mexican  Gulf  coast,  and  was  not 
provided  with  accurate  instruments  for  taking  observations.  Late 
one  afternoon  the  clouds  rolled  away,  and  we  distinctly  saw  the 
snow-clad  peak  of  Orizaba.  This  was  the  first  intimation  to  us 
that  we  were  "  somewhere"  ,  near  Vera  Cruz.  In  a  very  short  time 
we  saw  opposite  to  us  a  large  fleet  of  vessels  at  anchor. 

We  were  south  of  Vera  Cruz  and  were  passing  Anton  Lizardo, 
the  place  to  which  we  were  bound.  But  a  reef  was  between  us  and 
the  anchorage  where  the  fleet  was  quietly  lying.  The  Captain  of 
the  schooner  said  he  could  cross  the  reef.  Taking  his  place  in  the 
rigging  from  where  he  could  better  observe  the  breakers  and  the 
currents,  the  schooner  tacked  here  and  there,  rapidly  and  repeat 
edly,  under  the  orders  of  the  little  Frenchman  ;  and  we  were  soon 


17 

clear  of  the  reef  and  breakers.  It  was  now  nearly  dark.  In  a  few 
moments  after  reaching  the  anchorage  ground,  we  glided  up  a 
gentle  slope,  without  perceptible  shock  ;  and  the  bow  of  the  vessel 
was  almost  entirely  out  of  water. 

In  less  than  twenty  minutes  thereafter  a  boat  from  one  of  our 
men-of-war  pulled  alongside  ;  and  when  the  officer  in  charge  learn 
ed  who  we  were,  he  said  he  would  report  at  once  to  the  naval 
commander;  and  had  no  doubt  that  the  company  with  its  effects 
would  have  to  be  landed  on  an  adjacent  island,  while  the  schooner 
was  being  lightened  and  hauled  off  into  deep  water. 

He  said  the  movements  of  the  little  schooner,  through  the  heavy 
surf,  across  the  dangerous  reef,  had  been  watched  from  the  naval 
vessels  with  intense  anxiety,  and  expectation  that  we  would  be 
wrecked  and  all  hands  lost.  This  feeling  was  changed  to  admir 
ation  when  it  was  seen  that  the  schooner  was  being  very  skillfully 
handled  in  the  difficult  channel;  and  all  rejoiced  when  they  saw 
the  unknown  little  craft  safely  in  smooth  water;  but  were  surprised, 
immediately  after,  to  see  her  put  on  a  course  that  would  inevitably 
run  her  aground. 

We  found  that  Captain  Swift  with  the  convalescents  from  Mata- 
moros  on  another  vessel,  had  arrived  before  us.  In  the  meantime 
Lieutenant  J.  G.  Foster,  of  the  Engineer  Corps,  had  been  assigned 
to  duty  with  the  Company.  He  was  with  Captain  Swift.  I  at 
once  reported  to  the  latter,  and  he  resumed  command  of  the  Com 
pany;  but  the  men  remained  on  separate  vessels. 

Captain  Swift  was  still  very  sick  ;  to  all  appearance  more  feeble 
than  when  we  left  him  at  Matamoros.  All  the  men  he  brought 
with  him  were  convalescent.  In  a  few  days  after  our  arrival  at 
Anton  Lizardo,  an  order  was  issued  by  General  Scott  for  the  trans 
ports  to  move  up  next  morning,  towards  Vera  Cruz,  with  a  view 
to  landing  the  army  on  the  main  shore,  opposite  the  Island  of 
Sacrificios,  two  or  three  miles  south  of  the  city.  On  the  morning 
of  the  day  we  were  to  make  the  landing  the  whole  company  was 
transferred  to  another  vessel ;  and  all  were  again  together. 

Early  in  the  previous  night,  McClellan,  who  had  just  been 
aboard  the  vessel  on  which  Captain  Swift  arrived,  informed  me  that 
the  latter  proposed  to  lead  the  company  ashore.  Worth's  division 
was  to  land  first,  and  the  engineer  company  was  temporarily  as 
signed  to  that  division.  McClellan  added:  " The  Captain  is  now 
too  feeble  to  walk  across  the  cabin  of  his  vessel  without  assistance 
—the  effort  to  lead  the  company  in  this  landing  will  be  fatal  to 
him,  and  I  told  him  I  thought  he  ought  not  to  attempt  it.  But, 


18 

ho  looks  upon  me  as  a  boy,*  and  I  have  no  influence  with  him  in 
this  mutter.  You  ought  to  advise  him  against  this  thing.  If  ho 
attempts  it,  it  will  certainly  kill  him." 

I  fully  agreed  with  McC-k-llan  in  reference  to  the  physical  con 
dition  of  the  Captain;  ai-d  the  probable,  if  not  certain,  result  of  an 
attempt  on  his  part  to  lead  the  company  in  the  landing.  But  for 
me  to  advis3  him  not  to  go  ashore  with  us,  was  to  request  him  to 
give  me  the  command  of  his  company  in  this  important  entcr- 
]  rise.  I  told  McClellan  that  I  felt  a  delicacy  about  the  matter 
which  made  ir.c  hesitate  to  advise  the  Captain  to  give  me  the  com 
mand  of  the  company.  He  replied:  "Yes,  but  this  case  is  beyond 
mere  dclicac^7.  The  act  of  leading  the  company  ashore  will  kill 
him  ;  and  I  think  you  can  persuade  him  not  to  undertake  it.  You 
ought  to  try.  I  am  sure  he  will  not  misconstrue  your  motive." 

Urge  I  thus,  I  pulled  over  to  the  Captain's  vessel,  after  dark 
found  him  alone  in  the  cabin,  and  quickly  told  him  why  I  came. 
He  listened  patiently  to  all  I  had  to  say;  thanked  me  cordially 
for  the  interest  I  took  in  his  physical  welfare;  saLl  ho  fully  appre 
ciated  the  kindness  shown;  understood  the  motive  which  actuated 
the  advice  given  ;  and  addel :  "  My  mind  is  made  up;  I  will  lead 
the  company  in  this  landing;  and  would  do  so  even  if  I  knew 
that  the  bare  attempt  would  certainly  cost  me  my  life." 

The  next  afternoon,  the  Captain,  standing  by  the  gangway,  di 
rected  the  embarkation  of  about  20  men  in  the  smaller  of  the  two 
surf  boats  in  which  the  company  was  to  land.  Just  as  that  boat 
was  ready  to  pull  away  to  make  room  for  the  larger  boat,  I  said  to 
him:  "  I  suppose  I  am  to  go  with  this  detachment  of  the  Company; 
and  if  so  I  must  get  aboard  now  ".  He  replied  "  No.  I  wish  you 
to  go  in  the  larger  boat  with  me".  To  which  I  said:  "  All  right" , 
and  added:  "McClellan  goes  with  the  detachment?"  The  Captain 
said,  "Yes." 

When  the  larger  boat  for  the  rest  of  the  Company,  came  along 
ride  I  relieved  the  Captain  at  the  gangway  and  superintended  the 
embarkation  of  the  men  in  that  boat.  Tho  Captain  was  lowered 
over  the  side  of  the  vessel  r.\  a  chair;  and  I,  when  all  else  was 
roady  to  pull  off,  scrambler":  down  into  the  clos-jly  packed  boat,  and 
took  my  place  in  the  bow. 

Each  boat  was  rowed  by  sailers  from  the  fleet  under  the  direction 
of  a  naval  officer. 

We  had  reason  for  anxiety  in  regard  to  the  resistance  we  might 
meet  with  from  Mexican  batteries  that  could  easily  have  been 
sheltered  bth'nd  the  sand  hills  immediately  overlooking  the  open 

*  At  that  time,  McClolian  was  about  20  years. of  age. 


19 

beach  on  which  the  landing  was  to  be  made.  A  single  cannon-shot 
striking  one  of  the  closely  packed  surf-boats  would  probably  have 
sent  it,  and  all  on  board,  to  the  bottom.  The  anxiety  of  the  soldiers 
was  to  get  ashore  before  such  a  fate  should  befall  them.  They  cared 
very  little  for  anything  that  might  happen  after  they  were  on  land; 
but  wished  to  escape  the  danger  of  having  the  boats  sunk  under 
them  by  Mexican  batteries. 

When  we  were  within  five  or  six  hundred  yards  of  the  beach  all 
were  startled  by  the  whistling  of  shells  and  cannon  balls  close  about 
our  heads.  This  fire  was  soon  understood  to  come  from  our  Naval 
gunboats,  and  aimed  at  small  parties  of  Mexican  lookouts  on  shore. 
No  resistance  was  made  to  the  landing  of  Worth's  division. 

When  we  were  within  two  or  three  hundred  yards  of  the  beach, 
I  made  my  way,  over  the  heads  of  the  men  to  the  stern  of  the  boat 
where  the  Captain  was  seated;  and  said  to  him  I  thought  the  time 
had  come  for  him  to  get  to  the  bow,  if  he  still  intended  to  lead  the 
company  in  going  ashore. 

For  a  moment  the  most  painful  expression  I  ever  saw  depicted 
on  a  human  countenance  marked  his  face.  He  rallied,  however, 
almost  immediately,  and  said:  "  I  must,  at  the  last  moment,  relin 
quish  my  command  " ;  and  added  "  I  turn  the  command  over  to  you 
until  the  company  is  formed  in  line  on  the  beach  ". 

I  made  my  way  quickly  back  to  the  bow ;  ordered  the  right  file 
of  the  company,  two  stalwart  corporals — thorough  soldiers,  to  ^o 
to  the  stern  of  the  boat,  take  their  places  near  the  Captain,  keep 
their  eyes  on  me  after  they  reached  him,  spring  into  the  water 
when  they  saw  me  jump  from  the  bow,  seize  the  Captain,  place 
him  on  their  shoulders  or  heads,  and  bring  him  to  me  in  the  line 
on  shore,  without  a  wet  thread  on  him. 

I  informed  the  corporals  that  I  had  been  placed  in  full  command 
by  Captain  Swift;  warned  them  he  would  probably  resist  their 
bringing  him  ashore;  but  no  matter  what  he  said  or  did,  they 
must  obey  my  orders.  They  did  it.  The  corporals  were  athletes 
— over  six  feet  in  height,  young  and  active.  In  the  Captain's 
then  physical  condition  he  was  as  helpless  as  an  infant  in  their 
hands. 

The  water  where  they  went  overboard  was  nearly  up  to  their 
necks;  but  when  they  brought  the  Captain  to  me  he  was  as  dry 
as  whilst  sitting  in  the  boat.  He  had  resisted  them  more  violently 
than  I  anticipated.  In  vain  they  explained  to  him  that  they  were 
instructed  by  me  to  take  him  ashore  without  his  touching  the 
water.  He  ordered  them  to  put  him  down,  used  all  his  force 
to  compel  them  to  do  so,  repeated  his  orders  in  no  measured  terms, 


20 

and  continued  to  denounce  the  corporals  after  they  had  placed  him 
on  his  feet  by  my  side. 

He  was  wild  with  rage.  I  at  once  relinguished  to  him  the  com 
mand  of  the  company,  and  said:  "Captain,  the  corporals  are  not 
in  fault.  They  simply  obeyed  my  order  whilst  I  was,  by  your 
authority,  in  command  of  the  company.  Blame  me,  if  you  will, 
hut  exonerate  them  ". 

He  apologised  to  the  corporals  for  kicking,  striking,  and  other 
wise  abusing  them,  and  thanked  them  for  the  service  they  had 
rendered  him.  The  termination  of  this  incident  made  an  indelible 
impression  on  the  men  in  favor  of  their  Captain. 

That  night  the  company  slept  among  the  sand  hills  a  few 
hundred  yards  from  the  shore,  undisturbed,  except  by  a  flurry  of 
firing  which  occurred  about  10  P.  M.,  between  a  Mexican  detach 
ment  and  the  Light  battalion  of  Worth's  division.  This  firing 
continued  for  a  few  minutes,  and  then  all  was  quiet  for  the  rest  of 
the  night. 

About  sunrise  next  morning,  the  company  moved  several  hundred 
yards,  into  its  position  on  the  sand  hills,  on  the  right  of  Worth's 
division  in  the  line  of  investment,  facing  Vera  Cruz  which  was 
about  two  miles  distant. 

The  Captain  showed  wonderful  increase  of  vitality  after  he 
reached  the  shore.  He  conducted  the  company  to  its  assigned 
place  in  the  line  of  investment  without  much  apparent  difficulty 
in  walking  through  the  sand. 

But  three  hours  exposure  to  the  hot  sun  was  more  than  he  could 
bear ;  his  strength  was  gone.  He  lost  consciousness  and  was,  by 
my  order,  carried  to  the  beach  on  an  improvised  litter.  The  ser 
geant  of  the  party  was  instructed  to  report  to  the  naval  officer  in 
charge  of  the  surf  boats,  and  in  my  name,  request  that  Captain 
Swift  be  taken  as  soon  as  practicable,  to  the  steamer  which  was 
the  headquarters  of  General  Scott.  That  request  was  promptly 
complied  with;  but  the  Captain's  vitality  was  exhausted.  He 
was  sent  to  the  United  States  on  the  first  steamer  that  left  Vera 
Cruz  after  the  landing  was  effected,  and  died  in  New  Orleans 
within  twenty-four  hours  after  his  arrival  at  that  place. 

Thus,  the  army  and  the  country  lost  the  services  of  one  of  the 
best  officers  of  the  U.  S.  Corps  of  Military  Engineers;  and  the 
engineer  company  lost  their  trained  Captain. 


CHAPTER   II. 

ENGAGED   IN   OPERATIONS   AGAINST   VERA   CRUZ. 


Within  a  short  time  after  Captain  Swift  was  taken  to  the  beach, 
I  received  an  order,  from  General  Worth,  directing  me  to  withdraw 
the  engineer  company  from  the  line  of  investment  and  report  to 
General  Patterson.  The  latter  instructed  me  to  locate  and  open  a 
road  through  the  chapparal  to  the  old  Malibran  ruins.  This  was 
accomplished  by  the  middle  of  the  afternoon.  General  Pillow  who 
was  to  occupy  a  position  beyond  Malibran,  requested  me  to  take 
charge  of  a  working  party  of  his  troops  and,  with  the  engineer 
company,  locate  and  open  a  road  along  his  line  to  the  bare  sand 
hills  on  his  left.  In  this  work  we  were  somewhat  disturbed  by  the 
fire  of  Mexican  detachments. 

On  the  llth,  the  work  of  locating  and  opening  the  road  along 
the  line  of  investment  was  continued,  the  working  party  being 
still  a  good  deal  annoyed  by  both  infantry  and  artillery  fire.  At 
1  P.  M.,  I  reported  to  General  Patterson  that  the  road  was  opened, 
through  the  chapparal,  to  the  bare  sand  hills.  He  ordered  me  to 
report,  with  the  engineer  company,  to  General  Worth ;  and  the 
latter  directed  me  to  report  to  the  General  Headquarters. 

On  the  same  day  I  was  ordered  by  Colonel  Totten,  Chief  Engineer, 
to  find  and  cut  off  the  underground-aqueduct  which  conveyed 
water  into  Vera  Cruz.  That  business  was  effectually  accomplished 
by  the  engineer  company  on  the  13th.* 

From  that  time,  until  the  commencement  of  work  upon  the 
batteries  and  trenches,  the  engineer  company  and  its  officers  were 
engaged  in  reconnoitring  the  ground  between  the  picket  line  of 
our  army  and  the  fortifications  of  the  city.  My  reports  were  made 
each  night  to  the  Chief  Engineer.  The  night  of  the  15th,  he 

*  In  illustration  of  the  character  of  the  work  done  during  the  first  two  or  three  days  after 
the  landing,  the  following  quotations  from  General  Scott's  official  report  are  not  irrelevant. 
He  says: 

"  The  environs  of  the  city  outside  the  fire  of  its  guns,  and  those  of  the  castle,  are  broken 
into  innumerable  hills  of  loose  sand,  from  twenty  to  two  hundred  and  fifty  feet  in  height, 
with  almost  impassable  forests  of  chapparal  between."  "  In  extending  the  line  of  investment 
around  the  city  the  troops,  for  three  days  have  performed  the  heaviest  labors  in  getting  over 
the  hills  and  cutting  through  the  intervening  forests."  ("  Ex.  Doc.  No.  1 "  p.  216.) 

(21) 


22 

pointed  out  to  me,  on  a  map  of  the  city  and  its  fortifications,  the 
general  location  in  which  it  was  desired  to  place  the  army  gun 
battery,  on  the  southern  prolongation  of  the  principal  street  of  the 
city,  and  within  about  six  hundred  yards  of  its  fortifications.  He 
directed  me,  with  the  engineer  company,  to  closely  examine  that 
ground.  I  was  informed  by  him,  at  the  same  time,  that  Captain 
K.  E.  Lee,  of  the  engineer  corps,  had  discovered  a  favorable 
position  for  a  battery,  of  six  heavy  naval  guns,  on  the  point  of  a 
commanding  sand  ridge,  about  nine  hundred  yards  from  the 
western  front  of  the  city ;  but  no  final  decision  would  be  made  in 
regard  to  the  naval  battery  until  the  army  battery  could  be  defin 
itely  located.  He  said  General  Scott  was  getting  impatient  at  the 
delay;  and  I  was  directed  to  find,  as  soon  as  possible,  a  position 
that  would  satisfy  the  conditions  prescribed,  by  the  Chief  Engineer, 
for  an  army  battery. 

I  explained  those  conditions  to  McClellan  and  to  Foster;  and 
informed  them  that  I  would  assign  one-third  of  the  company  to 
each  of  them  as  an  escort — take  one-third  myself — and  we  would 
all  three  start,  at  daylight  next  morning,  in  search  of  a  location 
for  the  required  battery.  It  was  necessary  that  we  should  be 
extremely  careful  not  to  get  to  fighting  each  other  in  the  dense 
chapparal. 

We  found  a  location  that  complied  with  the  conditions.  In 
reporting  this  fact  to  the  Chief  Engineer,  I  added:  "The  com 
munication  with  the  battery  will  be  very  difficult — will  require 
a  great  deal  of  work — and  will  be  dangerous".  He  ordered  me  to 
take  the  engineer  company  to  the  selected  ground,  next  morning, 
and  lay  out  the  battery;  and  said  he  would  direct  Lieutenant  G. 
T.  Beauregard,  who  had  supervised  the  construction  of  the  field 
fortifications  at  Tampico,  to  assist  in  the  work. 

At  2  P.  M.  that  day  the  battery  and  magazine  had  been  traced 
out,  all  necessary  profiles  carefully  adjusted;  and,  the  whole  com 
pleted,  ready  to  commence  throwing  up  the  works.  We  had  not 
been  discovered  by  the  Mexicans — though  we  could  plainly  see 
their  sentinels  on  the  walls;  and  occasionally  hear  words  of 
command.  After  allowing  the  company  to  rest  for  a  couple  of 
hours  we  started  to  return  to  camp. 

In  going  forward  we  had  the  Mexicans  before  us ;  and  by  ex 
ercising  great  care,  at  certain  places,  could  avoid  being  seen. 
When  our  backs  were  turned  to  Vera  Cruz  I  felt  confident  that  we 
would  soon  be  discovered  and  fired  upon.  I  had  cautioned  the 
men  to  be  as  careful  as  possible ;  but,  in  spite  of  their  best  efforts,  we 
were  seen,  and  a  heavy  fire  of  artillery  was  opened  upon  us.  The 


order  to  move  at  double-quick  was  immediately  given.  The 
company  was  conducted  about  three  hundred  yards,  to  a  cut  in  a 
low  sand  ridge,  that  had  been  formed  by  a  road  crossing  that  ridge. 
All  got  safely  into  the  cut.  The  Mexican  artillery  fire,  aimed  at  us, 
was  continued  for  about  twenty  minutes.  We  had  then  before  us 
an  open  level  plain  for  five  hundred  yards.  Soon  after  the  fire 
upon  us  had  ceased,  I  ordered  the  men  to  scatter  and  run  rapidly 
across  the  plain  until  they  reached  a  designated  place  of  shelter 
behind  high  sand  hills.  Beauregard  and  I  brought  up  the  rear  in 
this  movement.  The  Mexicans  re-opened  their  guns  upon  us  whilst 
we  were  crossing  the  plain  and  continued  to  fire  for  some  time  after 
we  reached  the  shelter  above  referred  to. 

When  I  reported  the  result  of  that  day's  work  to  the  Chief  En 
gineer,  I  urged  him  to  permit  a  further  examination  to  be  made, 
for  a  location  of  the  army  gun  battery,  before  attempting  to  con 
struct  the  one  we  had  just  laid  out. 

He  consented,  and  we  made  further  reconnaissance  the  next  day. 
In  the  meantime  the  pickets  of  Worth's  division  had  been  con 
siderably  advanced.  On  returning  from  an  examination  at  the 
extreme  front  that  day  I  came  across  a  detachment  of  the  Fifth  In 
fantry  not  far  from  the  Cemetery.  Whilst  explaining  the  object 
of  my  search  to  a  group  of  four  or  five  young  officers,  a  person  whom 
I  took  to  be  a  veteran  sergeant,  said  to  me  that  he  knew  a  good 
position  for  a  battery,  only  a  few  hundred  yards  from  where  we 
then  were.  I  asked  him  to  describe  it  to  me. 

From  the  description  he  gave  I  thought  the  ground  referred  to 
would  be  a  favourable  site;  and  asked  him  to  tell  me  definitely 
how  to  reach  it.  He  offered  to  guide  me  to  the  place.  On  getting 
to  the  position  I  found  that  the  conformation  of  the  ground  consti 
tuted  almost  a  natural  parapet  for  a  six  gun  "battery — requiring 
but  little  work  to  complete  it  for  use.  It  afforded  immediate  shelter 
for  men  and  guns. 

It  was  not  on  the  prolongation  of  the  main  street  of  the  city,  and 
it  was  farther  from  the  enemy's  works  than  the  site  where  a  battery 
had  already  been  laid  out.  But  the  communications  with  the  pro 
posed  new  location  were  shorter,  and  could  easily  be  made  much 
safer — in  every  way  better  than  was  possible  in  the  former  case.  I 
thanked  my  guide  for  pointing  out  the  position  ;  and  told  him  I 
thought  it  would  be  adopted  by  the  Chief  Engineer. 

After  our  return  to  the  group  of  young  officers,  my  "  guide  "  was 
soon  called  away ;  and,  I  then  asked  one  of  them  the  name  of  that 
"  fine  old  Sergeant "  who  had  pointed  out  such  a  good  location  for 


24 

the  battery.  To  my  amazement  he  replied  ;  "That  was  Major  Scott, 
the  commander  of  our  regiment". 

The  Major  was  enveloped  in  an  ordinary  soldier's  overcoat  and 
wore  an  old,  common  slouched  hat.  I  had  mistaken  the  "famous 
Martin  Scott "  for  a  "  fine  old  Sergeant  "  of  the  line. 

On  my  return  to  camp  I  reported  all  the  facts  to  the  Chief  En 
gineer.  The  position  first  selected  and  laid  out,  for  the  army  gun 
battery,  was  abandoned ;  and  the  location  pointed  out  by  Major 
Martin  Scott  was  adopted. 

The  work  of  throwing  up  batteries,  digging  trenches,  and  making 
covered  communications  wTith  them,  was  commenced  on  the  night 
of  the  18th  by  large  working  parties  detailed  from  the  line.  After 
that  time,  the  officers  of  the  engineer  company,  including  myself, 
were  placed  on  general  engineer  service — supervising  the  con 
struction  of  the  siege  works.  All  the  engineer  officers  then  with 
the  army,  except  the  Chief,  were  in  regular  turn  detailed  for  that 
duty;  each  having  some  of  the  men  of  the  engineer  company  to 
assist  him. 

After  the  work  upon  the  army  gun  battery,  the  mortar  batteries 
and  the  trenches  had  been  fairly  commenced,  I  was  transferred  to 
the  naval  battery  and  took  my  regular  turn,  with  Captain  R.  E. 
Lee,  and  Lieutenant  Z.  B.  Tower,  in  superintending  its  construct 
ion.  I  was  in  charge  of  that  work  the  day  it  opened  its  guns  upon 
the  fortifications  of  the  city,  having  relieved  Captain  Lee  that 
morning.  Seeing  him  still  in  the  battery,  about  the  time  the  firing 
commenced,  I  asked  him  if  he  intended  to  continue  in  control ; 
adding,  "  If  so,  I  report  to  you  for  instructions  and  orders".  He 
replied:  "  No.  I  am  not  in  charge.  I  have  remained  only  to  see 
my  brother,  Lieutenant  Sydney  Smith  Lee  of  the  Navy,  who  is 
with  one  of  the  heavy  guns.  My  tour  of  service  is  over.  You  are 
in  control;  and,  if  I  can  be  of  any  service  to  you  whilst  I  remain 
here,  please  let  me  know  ". 

There  had  previously  been  a  difference  of  opinion  between  Captain 
Lee  and  myself  in  regard  to  the  dimensions  that  should  be  given 
to  the  embrasures.  The  Chief  Engineer  decided  in  favor  of 
Captain  Lee,  and  the  embrasures  were  changed  and  made  to  con 
form  to  his  views.  In  a  very  short  time  after  the  firing  began  one 
of  the  embrasures  became  so  badly  choked  that  it  could  not  be 
used  until  the  debris  could  be  removed.  Hastily  renewing  the 
blindage  of  brush-wood  that  had  been  used  to  conceal  the  work 
from  viewT  of  the  enemy  during  the  construction,  the  detail  of  en 
gineer  soldiers  then  on  duty,  in  the  battery,  cleared  the  embrasure 
of  the  obstructions,  removed  the  blindage,  and  the  gun  resumed  its 


• 


2,1 

fire.  Just  after  that  incident,  I  asked  Captain  Lee  what  he  now 
thought  in  regard  to  the  proper  dimensions  for  the  embrasures. 
He  replied:  "They  must  be  made  greater  when  the  battery  is  re 
paired  to-night." 

The  naval  detachment  had  only  forty  rounds  of  ammunition; 
which  was  expended  in  about  three  hours,  and  the  firing  had  to 
cease  until  the  arrival  of  the  next  naval  detachment.  The  latter 
when  it  came  into  the  battery,  had  only  forty  rounds  of  ammunition 
and  was  to  serve  until  relieved,  the  next  afternoon  by  a  third  naval 
detachment. 

Before  the  ammunition  of  the  first  detachment  wras  expended 
the  embrasures  were  all  in  a  very  bad  condition — the  battery  was 
almost  entirely  unserviceable  ;  and  before  the  second  detachment 
arrived  I  caused  the  embrasures  to  be  filled  up,  until  the  battery 
could  be  repaired  that  night  and  put  in  good  condition  for  re 
opening  the  next  day. 

The  second  naval  detachment  came  into  the  battery  about  the 
middle  of  the  afternoon.  The  naval  captain  in  command,  with 
out  consulting  me,  ordered  the  embrasures  to  be  cleared  at  once, 
with  the  intention  of  immediately  opening  fire.  Perceiving  what 
was  being  done  by  the  sailors  in  re-opening  the  embrasures,  I 
ordered  them  to  stop ;  and  asked  by  whose  authority  they  were 
acting.  On  being  informed  that  their  orders  came  from  the  com 
mander  of  the  detachment,  I  asked  them  to  point  him  out  to  me. 
I  immediately  introduced  myself  to  him,  as  the  engineer  officer 
in  full  charge  of  the  construction  of  the  battery,  and  told  him  if 
the  embrasures  were  cleared  the  battery  would  still  be  unfit  for 
service — that  it  could  not  be  repaired  until  that  night,  and  would 
then  be  put  in  better  condition  than  it  was  when  it  first  opened. 
The  army  gun  battery  would  be  ready  next  morning;  and  its  fire, 
combined  with  that  of  the  naval  battery,  after  the  latter  was  put 
in  good  condition,  would  be  "very  effective.  But,  if  the  naval  de 
tachment  opened  tire  that  afternoon,  the  battery  being  unfit  for 
service,  its  ammunition  would  be  exhausted  before  night  withoat 
hurting  the  enemy;  and  the  battery  would  necessarily  be  silent 
the  next  day,  when  the  army  battery  would  open  its  fire. 

The  naval  captain  insisted  that  the  embrasures  should  be  cleared 
at  once,  and  the  firing  resumed. 

I  protested  against  his  clearing  the  embrasures  and  told  him  that, 
but  for  the  appearance  of  the  thing,  I  would  leave  the  battery  and 
take  my  men  with  me  if  he  persisted  in  carrying  out  his  intentions. 
I  added  :  "  I  will  remain  here  until  regularly  relieved,  but  will 
continue  to  protest  against  the  course  you  propose  to  pursue". 


26 

He  then  told  me  that  it  was  "  the  General's  "  order  that  he  should 
open  fire  that  afternoon  as  promptly  as  possible. 

I  asked  him  why  he  had  not  told  me  of  that  order  in  the  first 
place;  and  added:  "It  is  not  customary  for  General  Scott  to  give 
orders  to  engineer  officers  through  officers  of  the  navy.  But,  if 
you  had  told  me  in  the  beginning  that  he  had  ordered  the  battery 
to  commence  firing  as  soon  as  possible  after  you  reached  it,  I  would 
have  accepted  his  order — coming  to  me  through  you." 

To  this  he  replied ;  "  I  did  not  say  the  order  came  from  General 
Scott."  I  asked  :  "Whom  did  you  mean  when  you  said  'the  General.' " 
He  told  me  that  he  meant  '*  General  Patterson."  To  which  I  re 
plied  :  "I  receive  no  orders  in  reference  to  this  battery  except  from 
General  Scott  or  the  Chief  Engineer  of  the  Army." 

The  naval  captain  finally  said  he  would  not  open  fire  until  next 
morning;  provided  I  would  report  the  circumstances  to  General 
Scott.  I  told  him  it  was  not  usual  for  me  to  report  my  action  di 
rect  to  the  General-in-Chief;  but,  I  would  report  all  the  facts  to  the 
Chief  Engineer  as  soon  as  I  was  relieved  and  had  returned  to  camp  , 
and  he  would  report  them  to  General  Scott. 

When  I  commenced  to  make  my  report  to  the  Chief  Engineer  he 
stopped  me ;  and  said  he  was  instructed  to  order  me  to  report  in 
person,  to  General  Scott  as  soon  as  I  reached  camp. 

I  obeyed  the  order ;  and  was  very  coldly  and  formally  told  by 
"The  General":  He  had  been  informed  it  was  my  fault  that  the 
naval  battery  had  not  opened  fire  against  Vera  Cruz  that  afternoon. 
I  answered  :  "  I  did  prevent  the  fire  being  opened ;  but,  that  act  was 
not  a  fault  on  my  part ;  and  I  can  convince  you  of  the  latter  fact 
if  you  will  give  me  a  hearing". 

He  replied — still  very  coldly — "  I  hope  you  can  do  so".  I  then 
related  to  him,  in  full,  all  that  had  occurred — as  briefly  stated 
above — between  the  commander  of  the  naval  detachment  and 
myself. 

My  reasons  for  opposing  the  opening  of  the  fire  of  the  battery 
seemed  to  produce  little  or  no  favorable  impression  on  General 
Scott  until  I  reached  that  part  of  the  narrative  in  which  I  replied 
to  the  naval  captain's  statement  that  he  meant  General  Patterson 
when  he  said  "tlie  General".  I  gave  General  Scott  the  exact  words 
I  had  used  in  replying  to  the  naval  commander.  At  this  he  rose 
from  his  seat — came  to  where  I  was  standing,  and  clasping  one  of 
my  hands  in  both  of  his;  said :  "  Thank  God  I  have  young  officers 
with  heads  on  their  shoulders  and  who  know  how  to  use  them". 
He  added:  "your  opinion,  and  your  action,  in  this  matter,  would 
do  credit  to  a  Field  Marshal  of  France" ! 


27 

To  which  I  made  no  reply,  but  thought  to  myself:  "  If  there  was 
a  sergeant  in  the  engineer  company  who,  in  view  of  the  plain  facts 
of  this  case,  would  not  have  known  that  the  naval  battery  ought 
not  to  open  fire  that  afternoon,  I  would  reduce  him  to  the  ranks 
before  night.'1 

The  following  extracts  from  my  official  report  of  these  operations 
may  not  be  amiss  in  this  connection : 

"  Whenever  we  have  acted  as  a  company  I  have  been  most  ably 
and  efficiently  supported  by  Lieutenants  McClellan  and  Foster  ; 
and  I  am  proud  to  say  that  the  non-commissioned  officers  and  men 
of  the  company  have  shown  great  willingness  and  skill  in  the  dis 
charge  of  the  important  duties  assigned  them.  Great  part  of  our 
labors  have  been  performed  under  fire.  On  such  occasions  I  have 
had  every  reason  to  be  satisfied  with  the  cool  deportment  and  con 
duct  of  the  company. 

"In  conclusion  I  regret  that  I  have  to  state,  a  serious  blow  was 
inflicted  on  the  military  pride  of  the  engineer  company  in  not  allow 
ing  them  to  participate  in  the  ceremonies  of  the  surrender,  when 
it  was  well  understood  that  the  troops  having  had  most  to  do  in  the 
attack  were  selected  to  take  a  prominent  part  in  the  proceedings." 

We  all  felt  that,  if  our  distinguished  Captain  had  been  with  us, 
we  would  have  been  called  on  to  take  part  in  those  ceremonies. 

The  Chief  Engineer,  Colonel  Joseph  G.  Totten,  in  his  report  of 
operations  against  Vera  Cruz,  says:  "The  obligation  lies  upon  me 
also  to  speak  of  the  highly  meritorious  deportment  and  valuable 
services  of  the  Sappers  and  Miners,  [  engineer  company  ]  attached 
to  the  expedition.  Strenuous  as  were  their  exertions,  their  number 
proved  to  be  too  few,  in  comparison  with  our  need  of  such  aid. 
Had  their  number  been  four-fold  greater,  there  is  no  doubt  the 
labors  of  the  army  would  have  been  materially  lessened  and  the 
result  expedited."  (Ex.  Doc.  No.  1.  p.  245). 


CHAPTER   III. 

AFTER   THE   SURRENDER  OF  VERA  CRUZ;   TO   THE 
OCCUPATION   OF   PUEBLA. 


From  the  capitulation  of  Vera  Cruz,  on  the  29th  of  March,  until 
we  left  that  place  on  the  13th  of  April,  the  engineer  company  was 
principally  engaged  in  assisting  engineer  officers  in  making  sur 
veys  of  the  fortifications  and  surrounding  ground,  in  dismantling 
our  own  batteries,  magazines,  &c.;  and  aiding  the  Quartermaster's 
Department  in  landing  and  placing  in  depot  the  general  engineer 
train  of  the  army. 

In  the  meantime,  on  the  7th  of  April,  I  reported,  through  the 
senior  engineer,  to  the  Adjutant-General  of  the  forces,  that  the  en 
gineer  company  would  be  ready  to  move  with  the  advance  division 
of  the  army  on  the  8th,  if  transportation  for  its  train  could  be  fur 
nished.  Transportation,  together  with  orders  to  move  with  the 
advance  division,  were  applied  for.  "  The  reply  was  that  General 
Scott  would,  at  the  proper  time,  order  such  transportation  for  the 
engineer  company  as  he  deemed  sufficient — and  would,  when  it 
was  his  pleasure,  order  the  company  forward."* 

Twigg's  division  left  on  the  8th ;  Patterson's  on  the  9th  ;  on  the 
llth  Worth's  division  was  ordered  to  move  on  the  13th  ;  Quitman's 
brigade  had  been  previously  sent  on  an  expedition  to  Alvarado; 
the  garrison  of  Vera  Cruz  was  designated.  Thus,  every  soldier  in 
the  army,  except  the  engineer  company,  had  received  instructions 
either  to  go  forward  or  to  remain. 

On  the  night  of  the  llth,  in  my  evening  report  to  the  Adjutant 
of  engineers,  I  asked  the  Senior  Engineer  f  then  serving  with  the 
army;  when  and  where  the  engineer  company  was  ordered;  what 
I  was  ordered  to  do;  arid  what  transportation,  if  any,  I  was  to  have. 

On  these  subjects  not  one  word  had  been  stated,  in  either  written 

*  Taken  from  my  official  report  for  the  month  of  April,  1847.    G.  W.  S. 

t  Colonel  Joseph  G.  Totten,  Chief  Engineer,  had  left  Vera  Cruz  and  returned  to  his  duties 
in  Washington  City.  Major  John  L.  Smith  then  became  Senior  Engineer  with  General  Scott's 
forces. 

(28) 


29 

or  printed  orders,  that  had  come  to  my  knowledge.  On  the  morn 
ing  of  the  12th,  General  Scott  consented  that  the  engineer  company 
should,  if  possible,  move  with  the  General  Headqaarters,  which 
left  at  4  p.  m.  that  day. 

I  then  applied  direct  to  the  Chief  Quartermaster  for  transport 
ation.  He  told  me  that  it  was  impossible  to  let  me  have  any 
teams  at  that  time — all  the  good  teams  had  been  taken  by  the 
army,  General  Worth  was  getting  the  last. 

A  positive  order  from  headquarters,  was  then  procured  by  the 
Adjutant  of  engineers,  requiring  the  Quartermaster's  Department 
to  furnish  transportation  for  the  engineer  train,  etc.  The  teams, 
such  as  they  were,  came  into  our  camp  about  dark  on  the  12th. 
That  night  the  wagons  were  loaded ;  and  we  started  half  an  hour 
before  daylight  on  the  13th. 

The  mules  were  wild,  the  teamsters  could  not  speak  English, 
some  of  them  had  never  harnessed  an  animal ;  and  it  was  soon 
apparent  that  the  men  of  the  company  would  have  to  put  their 
muskets  in  the  wagons  and  give  their  undivided  attention  to  the 
mules.  At  2  p.  m.,  after  struggling  through  the  deep  sand,  west 
of  the  city,  we  struck  the  firm  beach,  and  could  make  better 
progress,  for  about  three  miles,  to  Vergara,  where  the  road  leaves 
the  coast,  and  again  passes  through  deep  sand. 

In  the  meantime  one  team  had  become  broken  down  and 
useless  before  we  got  beyond  the  city.  In  order  to  procure  another 
I  had  to  take  some  of  my  own  men  into  the  mule  pen.  Three 
Mexicans  were  given  me  to  lasso  the  mules,  and  five  men  were  re 
quired  to  put  them  in  harness — seasick,  wild,  little  animals.  One 
teamster  deserted ;  one  had  his  hand,  and  another  had  his  leg 
broken  ;  and  a  number  of  mules  in  different  teams,  were  crippled. 

At  Vergara,  half  the  load  of  each  wagon  was  thrown  out,  before 
we  entered  upon  steep  ridges  and  deep  sand  immediately  after 
leaving  the  beach.  All  the  men  were  engaged  in  helping  along 
the  half  loaded  wagons.  That  night  we  slept  in  the  sand  ridges. 

On  the  14th,  we  reached  Santa  Fe,  eight  miles  from  Vera  Cruz, 
threw  out  the  half  loads,  and  returned  to  Vergara,  Before  we 
again  reached  the  beach,  the  men  had  actually  to  roll  the  empty 
wagons  up  every  hill,  the  mules  not  being  able  to  drag  them.  By 
10  p.  m.,  we  were  again  at  Santa  Fe,  having  killed  three  mules, 
and  the  men  being  worked  nearly  to  death.  Fortunately  for  us, 
several  good  mules  that  had  escaped  from  preceding  army  trains, 
came  out  of  the  chapparal  to  our  feed  troughs,  were  caught,  and 
"pressed"  into  engineer  service. 

From  Santa  Fe  the  road  was  much  better,  but  at  every  hill  the 


30 

men  had  to  take  to  the  wheels  and  help  the  mules — this  too,  after 
throwing  out  half  the  load  at  the  foot  of  some  of  the  steeper  hills. 
In  this  way,  we  reached  the  National  Bridge,  at  3  p.  m.  on  the  16th. 

General  Worth's  division  was  about  starting  from  that  place  to 
make  a  night  march  to  Plan  Del  Rio.  He  informed  me  that  our 
army  would  attack  the  enemy,  at  the-  Cerro  Gordo  Pass,  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  17th ;  and  said  he  desired  that  the  engineer  company 
should  accompany  his  division.  I  informed  him  that  my  men  and, 
animals  were  utterly  exhausted  and  could  not  go  any  further  with 
out  several  hours  rest.  But  I  assured  him  that  we  would  be  in 
Plan  Del  Rio  by  noon  of  the  next  day.  We  rested  at  the  National 
Bridge  until  11.  30  p.  m.,  on  the  16th.  and  reached  Plan  Del  Rio, 
about  11  a.  m.,  on  the  17th. 

AT  CERRO  GORDO.  Soon  after  our  arrival  at  Plan  Del  Rio,  I 
was  ordered  to  detail  an  officer  and  ten  men  of  the  engineer  com 
pany  to  report  to  General  Pillow  for  temporary  service  with  his 
division.  Lieutenant  McClellan  was  placed  in  charge  of  that 
detail. 

With  the  remainder  of  the  company,  I  was  directed  to  report  to 
Captain  R.  E.  Lee,  then  acting  as  Chief  Engineer  of  Twigg's 
division;  who  instructed  me  to  allow  the  men  to  rest,  whilst  I 
accompanied  him  to  the  front,  where  Twigg's  division  was  about 
going  into  action.  Captain  Lee  informed  General  Twiggs  that  the 
engineer  company  was  at  Plan  Del  Rio,  and  had  been  ordered  to 
serve  with  his  division.  I  was  directed  by  General  Twiggs  to  return 
at  once,  and  bring  the  company  to  the  front  as  soon  as  possible. 

The  action  of  the  17th  was  over  before  the  engineer  company 
arrived.  Captain  Lee  directed  me,  with  a  portion  of  my  men  and 
a  large  detailed  working  party,  to  construct  a  battery  that  night, 
in  a  position  he  had  selected  on  the  heights  we  had  gained  that 
afternoon.  This  was  a  work  of  some  difficulty,  owing  to  the  rocky 
nature  of  the  ground  and  the  small  depth  of  earth — in  some  places 
none,  and  nowhere  more  than  a  few  inches. 

About  3  A.  M.  on  the  18th  I  sent  one  of  my  men  to  the  foot  of 
the  hill  to  awaken  Lieutenant  Foster,  who  was  sleeping  there  with 
the  company,  and  tell  him  he  must  relieve  me  for  the  rest  of  the 
night. 

After  putting  Foster  in  charge  I  started  to  join  the  company — and 
became  sound  asleep  whilst  walking  down  the  hill.  Stumbling  into 
a  quarry  hole,  I  found  myself  sprawling  on  a  dead  Mexican  soldier 
—his  glazed  eyes  wide  open,  within  a  few  inches  of  mine.  For  a 
moment  1  felt  that  horror  of  a  corpse  which  many  persons  have,  at 
times,  experienced.  The  probability  that,  in  a  short  time  after 


31 

daylight — in  storming  the  strong  position  of  the  enemy — I  might 
be  as  dead  as  the  man  upon  whom  I  was  lying,  forced  itself  upon 
me. 

Before  I  could  regain  my  feet  streams  of  men  were  rushing  past 
me  in  the  darkness;  and  I  heard  and  recognised,  the  voice  of  Lieu 
tenant  Peter  V.  Hagner,  of  the  Ordnance,  calling  in  no  measured 
tone  or  language,  upon  these  stampeded  men  to  stop.  Whilst 
promptly  aiding  Hagner  to  bring  the  fugitives  to  a  halt,  I  forgot 
the  dead  Mexican,  and  the  whole  train  of  thought  connected  with 
the  corpse. 

When  something  like  order  was  restored  on  the  hillside  I  learned 
from  Lieutenant  Hagner  that  he  had  been  detailed  to  take  one  of 
our  heavy  guns  up  the  hill  to  the  battery.  A  regiment  of 
Volunteers  had  been  placed  at  his  disposal  to  man  the  drag-ropes. 
Their  arms  had  been  left  at  the  foot  of  the  hill.  On  finding  his 
way  blocked  by  trees,  Hagner  had  sent  to  procure  axes  from  the 
engineer  train ;  and  in  the  meantime  the  regiment  at  the  drag- 
ropes  had  been  permitted  to  lie  down.  Of  course  they  went  to  sleep. 
Suddenly  awakened  by  a  false  alarm  that  the  Mexicans  were  upon 
them,  they  rushed  down  the  hill  to  get  their  arms.  Hagner  soon 
procured  the  required  axes  and  the  gun  was  delivered  at  the 
battery  in  good  time. 

At  daylight  I  was  again  at  the  battery.  A  slight  epaulment  had 
been  finished  for  three  pieces  of  artillery,  the  platforms  were  laid, 
and  the  guns  in  position.  I  was  then  instructed  by  Captain  Lee, 
to  send  ten  men  to  report  to  him  for  special  service;  to  order 
Lieutenant  Foster  with  eight  additional  men,  to  report  to  him 
(Lee)  for  the  purpose  of  opening  a  road  for  the  light  artillery 
around  the  foot  of  the  hights;  and  I  was  ordered,  with  the  rest  of 
the  company,  to  report  to  Colonel  Harney,  who  was  then  in  com 
mand  of  Persifor  Smith's  brigade,  of  Twiggs'  division. 

I  was  instructed  to  accompany  that  brigade  when  it  moved 
forward  to  attack  the  enemy  in  position  on  a  hill  immediately  in 
front  of,  and  higher  than  that  on  which  our  battery  had  been  con 
structed.  The  Mexicans  were  in  strong  force  on  the  higher  hill. 

From  our  lower  position  we  could  not  clearly  see  their  lines  nor 
determine  how  they  were  fortified.  The  hill  they  occupied  was  flat 
on  top  and  their  lines  were  set  back  from  the  crest  of  the  pre 
cipitous  slope  which  faced  us.  The  storming  brigade  was  ordered  to 
halt  and  reform  just  before  reaching  fhe  top  of  the  higher  hill. 
At  this  point  they  were  below  the  plane  of  the  enemy's  fire,  and 
were  when  lying  down,  perfectly  protected.  In  this  position 
they  were  ordered  to  rest,  until  the  order  should  be  given  to 


32 

rise,    charge   and   carry    the   enemy's    works   by    open    assault. 

When  the  line  was  thus  formed,  I  requested  Colonel  Harney  not 
to  give  the  order  to  charge  until  I  could  go  on  the  plateau,  get  a 
clear  view  of  the  enemy's  works,  and  report  their  character.  I  soon 
informed  him  that  their  main  line  was  not  more  than  forty  or  fifty 
yards  from  where  our  men  were  then  lying,  that  the  fortifications 
were  very  incomplete,  offered  no  effective  obstacle,  and  we  could 
dash  over  the  works  without  a  halt.  I  then  ordered  my  men  to 
drop  their  tools  and  use  their  muskets. 

Whilst  I  was  making  this  report  to  Colonel  Harney,  our  attention 
was  drawn  to  quite  a  sharp  fire  that  the  Mexicans  had  suddenly 
opened  from  a  point  close  to  the  left  flank  and  in  the  prolongation  of 
our  line.  I  told  him  I  was  certain  there  were  no  fortifications  in 
that  position  ;  and  I  had  seen  no  troops  there.  The  fire  increased 
from  that  direction,  and  Colonel  Harney  ordered  me  to  proceed 
rapidly  with  my  men  to  the  left  of  our  line,  direct  two  companies 
on  that  flank  to  wheel  at  once,  to  the  left;  and  when  he  gave  the 
order  to  charge,  these  two  companies  and  the  engineers  would  move 
to  the  left  against  the  force  that  w^as  firing  upon  us  from  that  side. 

These  dispositions  on  our  left  were  made  in  a  very  few  moments, 
and  the  order  to  charge  was  given  immediately  thereafter.  The 
brigade  sprang  up,  dashed  over  the  short  intervening  space,  and 
were  almost  instantly  inside  of  the  Mexican  incomplete  works. 

After  a  short,  but  bloody,  hand  to  hand  struggle,  in  which 
bayonets,  swords,  pistols,  and  butts  of  muskets  were  freely  used,  the 
Mexicans  retreated  in  great  disorder.  The  troops  that  had  been 
faced  to  the  left  just  before  the  order  to  charge  was  given,  immedi- 
iately  found  themselves  in  the  midst  of  a  detachment  of  Mexicans, 
in  a  nest  of  surface  quarry  holes  which  gave  them  protection  from 
distant  fire  and  effectually  concealed  them  from  view  until  we  were 
among  them.  The  struggle  here  was  hand  to  hand,  and  sharp  for 
a  short  time.  But  they  were  driven  from  their  quarry  holes,  back 
on  their  main  line  which  gave  way,  and  their  own  guns  were  turned 
upon  them  before  they  could  get  off  the  field. 

Thus,  Persifor  Smith's  brigade,  under  Colonel  Harney,  carried, 
and  held  possession  of,  the  key-point  of  the  battlefield  of  Cerro 
Gordo. 

After  the  battle  the  various  details  of  engineer  soldiers  joined  in 
the  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  were  collected  together  at  Encerro,  and  the 
company  remained  with  Twiggs'  division  until  it  reached  Jalapa.  At 
this  place  it  was  furnished  by  the  Chief  Quartermaster  with  the 
finest  mule  teams  in  the  army.  This  gave  great  satisfaction  to  the 
men  who  had  struggled  so  hard  to  get  the  engineer  train  forward, 


33 

through  deep  sand,  from  Vera  Cruz.  To  add  to  their  elation,  they 
had  now  left  the  "  hot  lands ''  of  the  coast  behind  them,  had  reached 
a  temperate  climate,  4,000  feet  above  the  level  of  the  sea,  had 
escaped  the  dread  vomito  of  Vera  Cruz,  and  had  participated  closely 
in  the  great  victory  gained  by  Scott's  army  at  Cerro  Gordo. 

From  Jalapa,  Worth's  division  led  the  way,  the  engineer  company 
at  its  head.  During  the  halt  of  a  few  days,  at  Perote,  I  procured 
the  transfer  of  First  Sergeant  David  H.  Hastings,  from  the  Third 
Artillery  to  the  engineer  company.  He  was  considered  one  of  the 
best  sergeants  in  the  army,  and  was  at  once,  made  first  sergeant  of 
the  engineer  company.  Previous  to  that  time  we  had  only  an 
acting  first  sergeant.  The  company  entered  Puebla  with  Worth's 
division,  and  on  the  arrival  of  General  Scott  at  that  place  we  were 
again  ordered  to  report  to  general  headquarters. 

During  the  three  months  delay  of  the  army,  at  Puebla,  awaiting 
reinforcements  before  moving  into  the  valley  of  Mexico,  the  regular 
instruction  of  the  company — both  as  infantry  and  as  engineer 
soldiers — was  resumed.  Besides  the  "School  of  the  Sapper"  as 
taught  them  before  they  left  the  United  States,  the  men  were  now 
instructed,  theoretically  and  practically,  in  the  "School  of  the 
Miner  ".  They  were  engaged  too  in  work  upon  the  fortifications 
of  Puebla ;  and  had  practice  in  loop-holing  walls,  and  received  in 
struction  for  placing  towns,  villages,  etc.  in  a  state  of  defense. 
Whilst  at  Puebla  the  company  received  the  sad  news  of  the  death 
of  their  Captain. 

General  Scott,  in  his  official  report  of  the  battle  of  Cerro  Gordo, 
says;  "Lieutenant  G.  W.  Smith  led  the  engineer  company  as  part 
of  the  storming  force  [  under  Colonel  Harney  ],  and  is  noticed  with 
distinction  ".  ( Ex.  Doc.  No.  1,  p.  263). 

General  Twiggs,  in  his  official  report  of  the  same  battle,  states : 
"  Lieutenant  G.  W.  Smith,  of  the  enginoars,  with  his  company  of 
Sappers  and  Miners,  joined  Colonel  Harney's  command  in  the 
assault  on  the  enemy's  main  work,  and  killed  two  men  with  his 
own  hand".  (Ex.  Doc.  No.  1,  p.  278). 

In  Colonel  Harney's  official  report  of  this  battle  it  is  stated: 
lieutenant  G.  W.  Smith,  of  the  engineers,  with  his  company,  ren 
dered  very  efficient  service  in  his  own  department,  as  well  as  in 
the  storming  of  the  fort ".  (  Ex.  Doc.  No.  1,  p.  281 ). 


CHAPTER   IV. 

FROM  PUEBLA  TO  CHURUBUSCO. 


On  the  7th  of  August,  1847,  the  advance  of  General  Scott's  army, 
Twiggs'  division,  the  engineer  company  leading,  left  Puebla  and 
commenced  the  forward  movement  into  the  valley  of  Mexico.  The 
company  served  with  that  division,  until  Worth's  division  was 
placed  in  the  lead  during  the  turning  movement  made  by  the  army 
around  Lake  Chalco.  In  that  movement  the  engines  company 
was  at  the  head  of  Worth's  division. 

The  road  ran  between  the  western  border  of  the  lake  and  a  high 
range  of  hills  which,  in  some  places,  rose  from  the  water's  edge. 
The  road  was  narrow  and  rough ;  and  had  been  obstructed  by 
rolling  immense  masses  of  stone  upon  it  from  the  almost  overhang 
ing  cliffs.  These  obstructions  were  of  considerable  height  ;  they 
completely  blocked  our  way;  and  at  several  points  ditches  had 
been  cut  across  the  road. 

General  Worth  directed  the  Light  Battalion,  under  Colonel  C.  F. 
Smith,  to  advance  and  drive  off  the  Mexicans  who  were  firing 
upon  us — ordered  me  to  make  the  road  passable  for  artillery  and 
wagons  as  soon  as  possible — arid  notified  me  that  the  leading 
brigade  would  assist  in  that  work  when  called  upon.  I  immedi 
ately  asked  for  a  detail  of  500  men ;  put  them  to  work,  at  once, 
under  the  direction  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the  engineer  company, 
and  everything  was  progressing  rapidly,  when,  to  my  surprise, 
Lieutenant  J.  C.  Pemberton,  aide  to  General  Worth,  came  up  to 
me  and  insisted  that  the  whole  character  of  the  operations  should 
be  changed.  Whilst  he  was  elaborating  his  views  I  cut  him  short 
by  asking  if  he  had  any  orders  for  me  from  General  Worth. 
In  the  meanwhile  the  latter  had  reached  the  front,  without  either 
Pemberton  or  I  being  aware  of  his  presence.  Before  the  aide  had 
time  to  reply  to  my  question,  General  Worth,  in  a  very  peremptory 
tone  called  out  "Come  away  from  there  Mr.  Pemberton,  and  let 
Mr.  Smith  alone.  This  is  his  business — not  yours  ". 

In  a  few  hours,  the  road  was  put  in  such  condition  that,  by  the 
use  of  drag-ropes  and  men  at  the  wheels,  we  were  enabled  to  pass 
artillery  and  wagons  over  the  obstructions;  and  the  column  moved 
on  without  further  material  delay. 

34 


35 

After  reaching  San  Augustine,  and  passing  beyond,  the  forward 
movement,  now  on  the  main  road,  or  causeway,  leading  from 
Acapulco  to  the  city  of  Mexico,  was  checked  by  fortifications  about 
six  hundred  yards  in  our  front.  These  fortifications  crossed  the 
road  at  San  Antonio,  and  were  occupied  by  the  enemy  in  large 
force.  The  afternoon  of  the  18th  of  August,  was  spent  in  recon 
noitring  that  position. 

About  3  a.  m.,  on  the  19th,  I  received  an  order  to  return  to  San 
Augustine  with  the  engineer  company  and  its  train.  In  making 
our  way  from  the  head  of  Worth's  division,  along  the  main  road, 
towards  the  rear,  it  was  somewhat  difficult  to  arouse  the  men  of 
that  division,  who  were  sleeping  on  the  road,  and  get  them  to  clear 
the  way  for  the  passage  of  our  wagons. 

No  explanation  of  the  order  for  our  return  had  been  given. 
Just  after  the  dawn  of  day,  and  before  we  were  clear  of  the  division, 
two  soldiers  on  the  side  of  the  road,  were  lighting  a  fire  for  the 
purpose  of  preparing  coffee.  As  we  passed  them,  one  said  to  the 
other:  "  We  are  not  going  to  fight  to-day  :  Twiggs's  division  is  going 
to  fight ".  The  other  of  the  two  replied,  sneeringly :  "  What  do  you 
know  about  it?"  To  which  the  first  answered  :  "Don't  you  see 
those  young  engineer  officers,  with  the  engineer  company  and  their 
wagons?  They  are  going  back,  to  be  sent  on  another  road  with 
Twiggs's  division,  we  are  not  going  to  fight  to-day  ".  As  we  passed 
out  of  hearing  of  the  two  soldiers  I  said  to  McClellan,  who  was 
riding  by  my  side:  "  Did  you  hear  that?"  He  answered  "  Yes  and 
I  consider  it  the  handsomest  compliment  that  could  be  paid  to  the 
engineer  company.  The  private  soldiers  of  this  army  understand 
that  we  are  sent  where  the  hardest  work  and  hardest  fighting  are 
to  be  done — and  always  at  the  head  of  the  leading  division  ". 

We  reached  San  Augustine  a  little  after  sunrise,  August  19.  I 
will  now  quote  direct  from  my  official  report  of  these  operations. 

"Orders  were  [at  once]  received,  from  the  headquarters  of  the 
army,  directing  me  to  report  to  Captain  R.  E.  Lee,  of  the  Corps  of 
Engineers,  with  the  company  under  my  command,  and  [I]  was 
ordered  by  Captain  Lee  to  take  ten  of  my  men,  and  select  certain 
tools  from  the  general  engineer  train,  in  addition  to  those  carried 
along  with  the  company.  I  turned  over  the  command  of 'the  en 
gineer  company  to  Lieutenant  McClellan,  who,  under  the  direction 
of  Captain  Lee,  proceeded  at  once  to  commence  the  work  on  the 
road  from  San  Augustine  to  Contreras."  "In  about  one  hour  and 
a  half,  I  rejoined  the  command  with  the  necessary  implements  for 
[a  large  working  force  in]  opening  the  road.  Captain  Lee  directed 
me  to  retain  the  men  I  then  had  with  me,  and  to  take  charge  of  a 


36 

certain  section  of  the  road,  to  bring  forward  my  wagons  as  rapidly 
as  possible,  and  to  see  that  the  road  was  practicable  before  I  passed 
any  portion  of  it.  At  this  time  my  company  was  divided  into  five 
sections,  each  under  an  engineer  officer  directing  operations  on 
[different  portions  of]  the  road  ". 

AT  CONTRERAS.  General  Scott,  in  his  official  report,  says,  "By 
three  o'clock,  this  afternoon,  [August  19th.]  the  advanced  divi 
sions  came  to  a  point  where  the  new  road  could  only  be  continued 
under  the  direct  fire  of  22  pieces  of  the  enemy's  artillery  [most  of 
them  of  large  calibre]  placed  in  a  strong  entrenched  camp  to 
oppose  our  operations,  and  surrounded  by  every  advantage  of 
ground,  besides  immense  bodies  of  cavalry  and  infantry". 

In  my  official  report  it  is  stated  that;  "  The  head  of  the  column 
having  halted,  I  reached  the  front  in  time  to  receive  instructions 
from  Captain  Lee  to  halt  the  company,  collect  the  scattered  parties, 
and  to  examine  the  road  inclining  to  the  left,  while  he  went  to  the 
right.  Lieutenants  McClellan  and  Foster  had  been  for  some  hours 
detached.  Having  gone  about  four  hundred  yards,  I  heard  just 
ahead  sharp  firing  of  musketry ;  and  immediately  after  met  Captain 
McClellan,  of  the  topographical  engineers,  and  Lieutenant  Mc 
Clellan,  of  the  engineer  company,  returning  on  horseback — they 
had  come  suddenly  on  a  strong  picket,  and  were  fired  upon. 
Lieutenant  McClellan  had  his  horse  shot  under  him.  Information 
of  the  enemy's  picket  being  in  our  vicinity  was  reported  to  General 
Twiggs,  who  ordered  a  regiment  of  rifles  forward.  There  being 
several  engineer  officers  present  when  the  rifles  came  to  the  front, 
I  returned  to  my  company,  which  had  been  for  a  short  time  left 
without  an  officer.  Captain  Lee  about  this  lime,  sent  back  for 
Captain  Magruder's  battery,  which  was  conducted  by  Lieutenant 
Foster,  and  placed  in  position  by  Lieutenant  McClellan  ". 

"The  Third  Infantry  was  ordered  to  support  the  battery.  I 
moved  forward  with  this  regiment,  taking  my  company  and  pack 
mules,  loaded  with  tools,  and  placed  my  command  under  such 
shelter  as  could  be  found  on  the  left,  near  the  position  occupied  by 
the  Third  Infantry,  and  in  rear  of  the  battery.  Meeting  with 
Lieutenant  McClellan,  I  directed  him  still  to  remain  with  the 
battery/  but  to  order  Lieutenant  Foster  to  rejoin  the  company.  In 
a  few  moments  this  officer  reported  to  me,  and  brought  information 
that  the  troops  were  preparing  to  storm  the  enemy's  position." 

"  Riley's  brigade  had  moved  in  advance  by  our  right.  Leaving 
the  mules  and  tools,  I  moved  the  company  forward,  falling  in  with 
the  brigade  of  General  [  Persifor  ]  Smith.  Captain  Lee  being  present, 
with  his  consent,  I  requested  the  General  to  allow  the  engineer 


37 

company  to  fight  in  his  brigade.  He  told  me  to  take  the  head  of 
the  column,  and  to  direct  myself  towards  a  church  in  a  village, 
on  the  left  of  the  enemy's  battery—  between  it  and  the  city.  Whilst 
passing  down  the  hill  and  crossing  the  ravine,  the  enemy  were 
rapidly  appearing  [reinforcements  from  the. direction  of  the  city] 
on  an  eminence  beyond  the  church.  General  Smith  directed  me 
to  take  my  company  as  an  escort,  reconnoitre  the  village,  and  find 
out  whether  Colonel  Riley's  brigade  was  in  the  vicinity.  1  continued 
some  distance  beyond  the  church ;  and  returned  without  seeing  the 
brigade  under  Colonel  Riley,  which  had,  as  I  understood  after 
wards,  advanced-  very  near  [the  rear  of]  the  enemy's  battery. 
The  reinforcements  of  the  enemy  upon  the  hill  in  our  front  were 
rapidly  increasing.  They  had  at  this  time  probably  ten  thousand 
men,  on  the  height,  formed  in  line  of  battle.  Towards  dark  Colonel 
Riley's  brigade  returned  and  joined  the  troops  under  the  command 
of  General  Smith :  too  late,  however,  to  allow  time  for  forming  the 
troops  to  attack  the  enemy  [  on  the  hill  ]  in  our  front.  Lieutenant 
McClellan  joined  me  about  this  time  in  our  movement  on  the 
village.  Lieutenant  Foster,  who  was  on  horseback,  became  detached 
with  a  few  of  the  men,  and  did  not  rejoin  me  until  after  the  action 
on  the  morning  of  the  20th." 

"General  Smith,  very  soon  after  dark,  informed  me  that  the 
enemy's  main  battery  would  be  stormed,  [in  rear],  at  daylight  on 
the  morning  of  the  20th.  This  would  open  the  road  for  artillery, 
and  our  communications  with  [the  main  army  under]  General 
Scott  would  be  re-established.  I  received  orders  to  hold  the  en 
gineer  company  ready  to  move  at  3  a.  m.  and  to  take  my  place  on 
the  right  of  the  rifles.  On  the  morning  of  the  20th  there  was  con 
siderable  delay  in  the  movement  of  the  brigade  [raw  troops]  under 
General  Cadwallader,  by  which  General  Smith's  brigade,  now 
under  the  command  of  Major  Dimmick,  First  Artillery,  was  de 
tained  very  nearly  an  hour.  Part  of  the  Eleventh  Regiment 
[Cadwallader's  brigade]  lost  its  way,  caused  the  Voltigeurs  to  halt, 
thus  throwing  the  brigade  under  Major  Dimmick  still  further  from 
Riley's,  which  had  moved  very  soon  after  3  o'clock.  At  the  request 
of  General  Cadwallader,  Major  Dimmick  ordered  me  to  turn  over 
the  command  of  my  company  to  the  officer  next  in  rank,  and  to 
move  forward  and  conduct  the  troops  that  had  lost  their  way.  The 
whole  force  was  by  sunrise,  or  little  after,  halted  in  a  sheltered 
position  in  rear  of  the  enemy's  battery".  (  Ex.  Doc.  No.  1,  Appendix 
p.  67). 

I  reported  the  cause  of  the  delay  to  General  Smith  and  requested 
instructions  to  rejoin  my  company;  but  he  said  he  desired  that  I 


38 

should  remain  with  him  for  awhile.  By  his  order,  the  three  brigades 
were  soon  put  in  motion.  I  again  asked  him  to  permit  me  to  rejoin 
my  proper  command.  He  replied  "  Not  yet"  and  added:  "  I  will 
soon  give  you  instructions". 

Because  of  a  dense  fog  the  delay  in  reaching  the  position  in  rear 
of  the  Mexican  works  was  no  material  disadvantage.  The  fog 
began  to  disappear  about  the  time  I  reported  to  General  Smith. 
He  w^as  then  on  a  ridge  at  a  point,  about  600  yards  in  rear  of  the 
Mexican  works.  The  three  brigades  were  passing  around  the  ex 
tremity  of  that  ridge,  several  hundred  yards  in  rear  of  the  General. 
All  was  quite  in  the  lines  of  the  enemy.  There  was  another  ridge 
south  of  the  one  on  which  General  Smith  was  standing,  and 
separated  from  it  by  a  deep  and  very  narrow  valley.  The  sides  of 
both  ridges  were  precipitous ;  their  tops  sloped  gently  to  the  enemy's 
line. 

General  Smith  informed  me  that  Riley's  brigade  would  pass 
partly  beyond  the  extremity  of  the  second  ridge  ;  then  face  to  the 
left,  and  attack  a  strong  Mexican  detachment  which  was  in  position 
on  that  ridge,  several  hundred  yards  in  rear  of  their  works.  Riley 
was  ordered  to  drive  that  detachment  and  pursue  it  closely  into 
the  Mexican  main  lines.  Cadwallader's  brigade  would  go  on  when 
Riley  faced  to  the  left;  and,  as  soon  as  he  passed  Riley,  Cadwallader 
would  also  face  to  the  left  and  come  into  action  on  Riley's  right. 
Smith's  own  brigade  would  turn  to  the  left  before  reaching  the 
extremity  of  the  second  ridge.  The  Third  Infantry  and  First 
Artillery  would  advance  in  the  deep  valley  between  the  two  ridges  ; 
whilst  the  Rifle  Regiment,  with  the  engineer  company  leading, 
would  ascend  the  steep  slope  of  the  second  ridge,  and  get  into 
position  on  the  flank,  or  rear,  of  the  Mexican  detachment  which 
Riley  was  to  attack  in  front.  In  the  meantime  the  head  of  Smith's 
brigade  had  come  within  view,  near  the  foot  of  the  steep  slope  of 
the  second  ridge,  and  was  moving  towards  the  Mexican  main  line. 

General  Smith  pointed  out  to  me  the  route  to  be  taken  to  reach 
the  top  of  the  second  ridge;  and  ordered  that  the  engineer  company 
and  rifles  should  bear  to  the  right,  and  on  getting  near  the  Mexi 
can  detachment,  remain  concealed,  and  quiet,  until  Riley's  brigade 
became  well  engaged;  then  join  in  the  attack  and  pursuit  of  that 
detachment. 

With  these  specific  instructions,  I  was  ordered  to  rejoin  my 
company  ;  and  Lieutenant  Beauregard  was  directed  to  take  general 
charge  of  the  movements  of  Smith's  brigade.  When  Beauregard 
and  I  reached  the  top  of  the  second  ridge  we  found  we  were  50 
yards,  or  less,  in  rear  of  the  Mexican  detachment,  which  was  facing 


39 

Riley,  All  was  quiet.  In  a  very  few  moments  Riley's  fire  com 
menced. 

The  engineer  company,  followed  by  the  rifle  regiment  was  then 
forming  in  line,  under  cover,  in  rear  of  the  Mexican  detachment, 
whose  attention  was  concentrated  on  Riley,  in  their  front.  We 
were  between  that  detachment  and  the  Mexican  works.  A  small 
portion  only  of  the  Rifle  Regiment  was  in  line,  when  the  firing 
with  Riley  became  very  severe,  and  the  order  was  given  for  the 
engineer  company  and  rifles  to  rise  and  fire  into  the  backs  of  the 
enemy.  That  fire  was  very  destructive.  The  Mexicans  were  as 
tounded  ;  faced  squarely  about,  and  in  a  moment  precipitately 
retreated. 

In  my  official  report  it  is  stated  that :  "  Colonel  Riley's  advance 
became  engaged  with  a  very  strong  picket,  some  300  yards  or  more 
from  the  rear  of  the  [enemy's]  battery,  near  the  crest  of  the  ridge ; 
the  engineers  and  rifles  came  up  at  once  in  position  to  take  the 
picket  in  rear,  delivered  a  deadly  volley  within  50  yards,  cheered 
and  rushed  on.  The  enemy's  force  fled  ;  the  head  of  our  column 
crossed  the  line  of  their  retreat,  which  brought  the  right  of  the 
column  [engineer  company  and  rifles]  conducted  by  Lieutenant 
Beauregard,  in  contact  with  the  Seventh  Infantry,  which  formed 
the  left  of  Colonel  Riley's  brigade.  I  went  into  the  enemy's  battery 
with  the  colors  of  the  Seventh  Infantry,  my  company  immediately 
behind  me.  The  enemy,  or  at  least  a  portion  of  them,  stood  to 
their  guns  well,  and  delivered  a  fire  of  grape  into  our  troops  when 
the  head  of  the  column  was  within  25  yards  of  their  pieces.  Our 
troops  followed  the  retreating  enemy  without  halting  until  they 
were  beyond  the  reach  of  our  musketry.  Lieutenant  Beauregard 
then  strongly  advised  that  the  troops  be  halted  and  formed.  A 
short  time  afterwards  General  Twiggs,  came  up.  The  pursuit  was 
resumed.  At  San  Angel  we  had  an  unimportant  skirmish  ".  (Ex. 
Doc.  No.  1,  Appendix,  p.  68). 

The  following  additional  quotations  from  my  official  report  are 
not  deemed  irrelevant : 

"  In  the  action  of  the  morning  of  the  20th — the  battle  of  Con- 
treras — my  men  acted  with  great  gallantry;  their  promptness  in 
obeying  every  order,  and  the  effect  with  which  they  used  their 
muskets,  entitle  them  all  to  the  highest  praise.  In  my  report  to  the 
chief  engineer  in  the  field,  I  shall  make  special  mention  of  all  who, 
to  my  knowledge,  particularly  distinguished  themselves.  I  will 
mention  here,  First  Sergeant  D.  H.  Hastings,  of  the  engineer  com 
pany,  who,  by  his  gallant  conduct  and  soldiery  bearing,  in  this 
action,  richly  deserves  promotion  to  the  rank  of  commissioned 


40 

officer  in  the  army.  Sergeant  Hastings  was  slightly  wounded  by 
my  side  in  the  battery.  Sergeant  [S.  H.]  Starr  attracted  my  par 
ticular  attention  by  his  gallant  and  efficient  conduct.  Sergeant 
Starr  was  the  ranking  non-commissioned  officer  with  the  detach 
ment  of  the  engineer  company  which  accompanied  Colonel  Harney's 
command  at  the  battle  of  Cerro  Gordo.  I  would  recommend  him 
for  promotion  [to  the  grade  of  commissioned  officer  in  the  army]." 

"Artificer  W.  H.  Bartlett  attracted  my  particular  attention  by 
[his]  cool  and  steady  gallantry,  Artificer  A.  S.  Read  shot  the  color 
bearer  of  the  Twelfth  Regiment  of  artillery,  and  secured  the 
color." 

"  Lieutenant  Foster  was  at  this  time,  as  I  have  before  remarked, 
detached  with  a  portion  of  the  company;  and,  at  the  head  of  his 
men,  led  the  Ninth  and  Twelfth  Regiments  of  Infantry  in  their 
attack  on  the  flank  of  the  retreating  column  at  Contreras." 

"  Lieutenant  McClellan,  frequently  detached,  and  several  times 
in  command  of  the  engineer  company,  is  entitled  to  the  highest 
praise  for  his  cool  and  daring  gallantry,  on  all  occasions,  in  the 
actions  of  both  the  19th  and  20th."  (Ex.  Doc.  No.  1,  Appendix,  p. 
69.) 

In  the  pursuit,  we  passed  through  the  village  of  San  Angel ;  and 
near  that  place,  were  again  halted.  During  that  halt,  I  noticed  a 
large,  high  building,  in  an  extensive  open  field,  five  or  six  hundred 
yards  to  the  North.  I  was  satisfied  that  from  the  top  of  that  build 
ing,  with  a  powerful  field  glass,  which  was  a  portion  of  the  engineer 
company  equipment,  I  would  be  able  to  get  a  good  view  of  the  level 
country  for  miles  around,  and  obtain  quite  definite  knowledge  of 
the  positions  and  movements  of  the  main  Mexican  forces. 

I  communicated  my  wishes  to  Major  Loring;  and  asked  him  if 
he  felt  authorized  to  support  the  engineer  company,  with  the  Rifle 
Regiment,  in  a  close  reconnaissance  of  the  building  I  pointed  out. 
He  laughingly  replied :  "  I  have  been  directed  by  General  Smith  to 
follow  you  and  your  company — of  course  I  will  go  with  you  ". 

We  had  not  proceeded  more  than  two  hundred  yards  towards 
the  building  when  we  were  overtaken  by  Lieutenant  Van  Dorn, 
Aide  to  General  Smith,  who  brought  an  order  requiring  the  Rifle 
Regiment  and  the  engineer  company  to  return  to  the  head  of  the 
column  on  the  road.  I  told  Van  Dorn  the  purpose  I  had  in  view, 
asked  him  to  explain  the  matter  to  General  Smith,  and  expressed 
my  conviction  that  he  would  approve  the  movement,  when  he 
knew  its  object.  Van  Dorn  replied:  "General  Smith  was  very 
peremptory.  I  am  directed  to  see  that  you  and  Major  Loring, 
with  your  respective  commands,  return  at  once  ".  On  our  wav 


41 

back,  Van  Dorn  said  that  General  Pillow  had  reached  the  front 
and  taken  control;  and  his  belief  was  that  General  Pillow  had 
ordered  General  Smith  to  recall  the  engineer  company  and  the 
Rifle  Regiment.  A  short  time  thereafter  we  moved  from  San  Angel 
to  Coyocan,  where  the  head  of  the  column  again  halted ;  and  was 
soon  joined  by  General  Scott. 

There  is  good  reason  to  believe  that  observations,  which  could 
easily  have  been  made  from  the  roof  of  the  high  building  above 
referred  to,  would  have  resulted  in  obtaining  such  information  in 
regard  to  the  Mexican  position  at  the  Convent  of  Churubusco  and 
at  the  tete-de-pont,  as  would  have  enabled  General  Scott  to  complete 
the  rout  of  the  Mexican  Army  without  incurring  the  additional 
loss  of  nearly  one  thousand  men  in  killed  and  wounded. 

AT  CHURUBUSCO.  The  following  quotations  are  taken  from  my 
official  report: 

"  Between  12  and  1  o'clock,  p.  m.,  [August  20,  1847]  I  received 
orders  to  move,  from  the  village  of  [Coyocan]  immediately  after  the 
rifle  regiment,  on  a  road  intersecting  the  road  from  San  Antonio 
to  Mexico,  in  order  to  cut  off  the  enemy  already  retreating  from 
San  Antonio. 

"  I  had  not  gone  two  hundred  yards  when  I  received  orders  to 
countermarch  and  move  on  another  route  intersecting  the  road 
from  San  Antonio  to  the  city  nearer  to  Mexico.  [The  latter  road 
led  nearly  due  east,  parallel  to  the  front  of  the  earthworks  at  the 
Convent,  distant  from  those  works  about  250  yards].  The  regiment 
of  riflemen  continued  on  the  road  on  which  I  first  started.  [This 
road  led  south-east  from  Coyocan].  The  company  took  its  place 
[again]  at  the  head  of  the  column  [Twiggs's  division].  The  column 
was  halted  by  General  Twiggs,  and  I  was  directed  by  him  to  send 
an  officer  in  advance  to  see  the  position  of  a  battery  reported  to  be 
not  far  in  front.  Lieutenant  McClellan  was  sent  on  one  road;  and 
Lieutenant  Stevens  of  the  engineers,  was  directed  by  General 
Twiggs,  to  take  another.  Both  officers  soon  returned  and  reported 
a  battery  in  front  of  a  convent,  the  roof  and  steeples  of  which  were 
in  plain  view  of  the  head  of  the  column  and  within  700  yards. 
The  roof  was  crowded  with  troops ;  the  battery  was  masked  by 
intervening  trees  and  cornfields.  General  Twiggs  then  directed 
these  officers  to  make  a  closer  reconnaissance  and  ordered  my 
company  as  an  escort.  Having  proceeded  500  yards,  we  saw  [  Mex 
ican  ]  troops  on  our  right,  left,  and  in  front.  A  lancer  was  taken 
prisoner.  Lieutenant  Stevens  directed  me  to  take  the  prisoner  to 
the  general  and  request  an  additional  escort  of  two  companies. 
We  were  at  this  time  about  300  yards  from  the  batterv,  but  it  was 


42 

still  almost  masked  from  view.  I  delivered  the  prisoner  and  the 
message  to  General  Twiggs,  and  returned  at  once  to  my  company 
which  I  had  left  in  charge  of  Lieutenant  Foster.  Lieutenant 
Stevens  ioined  General  Twiggs  whilst  I  was  with  him.  When  I 
resumed  command  of  the  company,  Lieutenant  McClellan  reported 
to  me  that  our  troops  were  already  engaged  in  our  front;  having,  ap 
parently,  turned  the  battery  and  convent  by  our  right.  One  of 
General  Twiggs's  staff,  [Lieutenant  W.  T.  H.  Brooks,  A.  A.  Adjutant 
General,  Twiggs's  division,]  was  present  and  informed  us  that  the 
rifles  with  Captain  Lee  of  the  engineers,  were  reconnoitring  the 
same  works,  and  had  gone  to  our  right  "considerably  farther  from 
the  battery  than  we  then  were.  We  all  concurred  in  opinion  that 
the  rifles  were  engaged  with  a  vastly  superior  force.  There  was 
at  this  time  no  firing  of  artillery.  I  ordered  Lieutenant  McClellan 
to  report  the  result  of  his  observations  to  General  Twiggs.  He 
did  so,  and  on  the  recommendation  of  Lieutenants  Stevens  and 
McClellan,  in  which  I  concurred,  the  First  Regiment  of  Artillery 
was  ordered  to  support  the  rifles.  The  firing  on  the  right  increased  ; 
it  was  evident  that  several  thousands  of  the  enemy  were  pouring 
a  heavy  musketry  fire  into  our  troops  on  the  right.  The  tops  of 
the  convent  and  the  surrounding  walls  were  lined  with  troops; 
the  roof  was  literally  covered.  Lieutenant  Stevens  was  of  opinion 
that  a  few  rounds  of  grape  would  disperse  these  masses  and  relieve 
our  troops  already  engaged  [on  the  right]  from  a  destructive 
plunging  fire.  He  went  back  to  the  general,  leaving  myself  the 
senior  engineer  then  in  front  of  the  [convent]  battery.  The  fire 
had  now  become  very  brisk  upon  my  [reconnoitring]  party  ;  having 
placed  the  company  under  the  best  shelter  at  hand,  with  Lieu 
tenant  Foster  I  proceeded  to  examine  the  works  to  determine  the 
number,  character  and  position  of  the  pieces  of  artillery.  Nothing 
heavier  than  a  4  or  6-pounder  had  yet  been  fired."  (Ex.  Doc.  No. 
1,  Appendix,  p.  69.) 

In  my  official  report  it  is  further  stated  that:  "The  troops  had 
become  engaged  in  our  front  within  ten  minutes  after  a  reconnais 
sance  had  been  ordered  by  General  Twiggs,  and  before  the  officer 
whom  I  was  escorting  had  been  able  to  make  a  single  observation  ". 

In  my  official  copy  of  that  report,  I  find  the  following  sentence, 
which  is  not  in  the  printed  report : 

"  Deeply  do  I  regret  that  the  attack,  in  advance  of  the  reconnoit 
ring  party,  precipitated  the  attack  on  our  side,  and  involved  us  in 
action  against  we  knew  not  what ". 

The  force  which  became  engaged,  far  to  our  right — before  the 


43 

t 

reconnaissance,  supported  by  the  engineer  company,  fairly  com 
menced,  was  the  advance  of  Worth's  division  pursuing  the  Mexicans 
who  had  abandoned  their  strong  works  at  San  Antonio. 

Captain  James  L.  Mason,  engineer  of  Worth's  division,  says,  in 
his  official  report,  that  the  works  attacked  by  that  division,  and 
"  so  gallantly  stormed,  had  not  been  reconnoitred  ". 

The  engineers  in  front  of  the  convent,  being  informed  that  the 
rifles  with  Captain  Lee  had  gone  to  our  right  considerably  farther 
from  the  battery,  advised  that  the  rifles  be  supported  by  an  addition 
al  regiment.  The  same  engineers  advised  that  one  gun  be  sent  to 
the  front  to  drive  the  Mexicans  from  the  roof  of  the  convent,  and 
thus  relieve  our  troops  on  the  right  from  a  destructive  plunging 
fire. 

The  additional  escort  of  two  companies,  asked  for  by  the  recon 
noitring  engineers,  had  not  come  to  the  front.  After  Lieutenant 
Stevens  had  gone  back  to  General  Twiggs,  to  have  one  gun  with  a 
few  rounds  of  proper  ammunition  sent  forward  for  the  purpose  of 
clearing  the  roof  of  the  convent,  the  firing  in  our  front,  on  the 
San  Antonio  road,  had  materially  increased;  and  the  fire  from  the 
convent,  upon  the  engineer  company,  was  becoming  troublesome. 
There  had  been,  to  me,  unexpected  delay  in  bringing  the  one  gun 
forward ;  and  I  determined,  as  already  stated,  to  place  the  men 
under  the  best  shelter  at  hand,  and  endeavor  to  make,  in  person,  a 
closer  examination  of  the  works. 

Resuming  quotations  from  my  official  report — it  is  therein  stated : 

"  At  this  time  the  First  Artillery  came  up  to  where  I  was.  The 
lamented  and  gallant  Burke,  at  the  head  of  the  leading  company, 
asked  which  direction  they  were  to  take.  I  inquired  what  were 
his  orders.  He  said  that  the  regiment  was  ordered  to  support  the 
Rifles.  I  pointed  to  the  smoke,  which  was  all  we  could  see  by 
which  to  determine  the  position  of  our  troops  engaged  in  a  corn 
field  on  our  right ;  told  him  that  they  reached  their  present  place 
by  moving  farther  to  the  rear,  out  of  range  of  the  works;  and  re 
marked  to  him  that  the  fire  through  which  he  would  have  to  pass 
in  the  direction  he  was  going  was  very  severe.  He  replied  that 
they  were  ordered  to  move  by  that  road  to  support  the  Rifles.  The 
First  Artillery  filed  by  and  soon  encountered,  at  a  distance  of  150 
yards  from  the  enemy,  the  heaviest  fire  of  artillery  and  musketry, 
followed  almost  immediately  after  [by  that]  brought  to  bear  upon 
Taylor's  battery,  which  had  been  ordered  to  fire  upon  the  convent ; 
and,  in  selecting  a  place  suitable  for  managing  the  guns,  had  most 
unfortunately  been  placed,  entirely  exposed,  directly  in  front  of  a 
well  constructed  battery  with  heavy  pieces  firing  in  embrasure." 


44 

"As  the  First  Artillery  filed  by  me,  I  ordered  my  company  to  be 
formed,  determined  to  go  on  with  the  reconnaissance;  and  if 
possible,  send  back  to  the  general,  [Twiggs,]  accurate  information 
in  reference  to  the  works  of  the  enemy  and  the  position  of  our  own 
troops,  which  at  that  time  I  could  not  understand.  In  moving 
forward,  I  was  opposite  the  centre  of  the  [  First]  Artillery  which 
inclined  more  to  the  left,  toward  the  battery,  whilst  I  kept  nearer 
the  [principal  road  leading  almost  due  east  from  Coyocan].  The 
ground  was  level,  but  some  shelter  was  afforded  to  small  bodies  of 
men,  by  the  ditches,  maguey  plant,  etc.  I  ordered  my  men  to 
separate,  to  shelter  themselves  as  much  as  possible,  [and]  to  keep 
within  supporting  distance  of  me.  I  proceeded  about  two  hundred 
yards.  I  ordered  every  man  to  shelter  himself  in  a  small  ditch 
which  was  fortunately  near  us ;  immediately  after  I  heard  the  fire 
of  Taylor's  battery  passing  directly  over  my  head.  [When  that 
fire  commenced  we  were]  in  the  corn-field,  about  half-way  between 
Taylor's  battery  and  the  enemy.  Requiring  my  command  to  lie 
close,  with  Lieutenant  Foster,  I  made  my  way  to  an  old  ruined 
wall  in  the  open  space  east  of  the  corn-field,  and  from  that  position 
sent  Lieutenant  Foster  to  General  Twiggs  to  report  the  extent  of 
the  line  engaged  on  the  right,  that  we  were  directly  in  front  of  the 
works  [which  were  now  in  plain  view],  and  that,  in  my  opinion, 
the  whole  force  under  General  Twiggs's  command  should  turn  the 
enemy's  position  by  our  left.  Another  battery  [of  the  enemy]  was 
seen  distinctly  to  our  right  and  far  in  rear  of  the  Churubusco  bat 
tery,  apparently  enfilading  our  line  engaged  on  the  right.  General 
Twiggs  had  already  sent  Colonel  Riley's  brigade  to  turn  the  posi 
tion  by  our  left,  and  take  the  battery  by  the  gorge.  When  Lieu 
tenant  Foster  returned,  I  withdrew  the  company  to  a  position  of 
more  safety,  and  joined  General  Smith  and  Lieutenant  Stevens, 
who  were  near  the  place  from  which  I  started  with  the  First  Artil 
lery.  I  remained  there  [under  General  Smith's  order]  until  after 
the  action."  (Ex.  Doc.  No.  1,  Appendix,  pp.  70-71.) 

That  point  was  about  300  yards  south-west  of  the  convent. 
There  were  several  adobe  houses  near,  and  from  it  a  road  along 
which  there  were  some  huts,  led  to  the  convent,  and  another  road, 
almost  due  east,  passed  in  front  of  the  convent.  In  moving  for 
ward  I  had  kept  nearer  the  latter  road,  the  First  Artillery  nearer 
the  former.  The  point  I  reached  in  the  open,  east  of  the  corn-field, 
was  within  less  than  100  yards  of  the  works  at  the  convent,  and 
there  was  every  indication  that  these  works  did  not  extend  along 
the  western  side  of  that  building. 

The  place  at  which  I  joined   General   Smith  and   Lieutenant 


45 

Stevens,  after  I  returned  from  beyond  the  corn-field,  was  that  at 
which  it  had  been  proposed  to  place  one  gun,  under  cover  of  the 
adobe  hut ;  run  it  out  by  hand  ;  fire,  and  run  it  under  shelter 
again  to  reload.  By  this  means,  a  few  rounds  of  grape,  canister, 
and  shrapnel,  could  have  cleared  the  roof  of  the  convent. 

In  more  senses  than  one,  the  firing  of  Taylor's  battery  through 
the  ranks  of  the  engineer  company,  in  the  corn-field,  was  a  sur 
prise  to  me.  I  learned  from  Lieutenant  Stevens  that,  when  he 
applied  for  one  gun  to  be  sent  to  the  front,  those  in  authority  had 
deemed  it  best  to  send  forward  a  whole  battery,  and  place  it  in  an 
open  field,  square  in  front  of  the  fortifications. 

The  battle  of  Churubusco  was  commenced,  and  mostly  fought, 
haphazard,  against  the  front  of  the  Mexican  fortified  lines,  without 
giving  time  for  proper  reconnaissance. 

General  Scott,  in  his  official  report  of  the  battle,  says :  "Lieutenant 
Stevens  of  the  engineers,  supported  by  Lieutenant  G.  W.  Smith's 
company  of  sappers  and  miners,  of  the  same  corps,  was  sent  to  recon 
noitre  the  strongly  fortified  church  or  convent  of  San  Pablo  in  the 
hamlet  of  Churubusco — one  mile  off  [from  Coyocan].  Twiggs  with 
one  of  his  brigades  [Smith's,  less  the  rifles]  and  Captain  Taylor's  field 
battery,  were  ordered  to  follow  and  to  attack  the  convent.  Major 
Smith,  senior  engineer,  was  despatched  to  concert  with  Twiggs  the 
mode  of  attack,  and  Twiggs's  other  brigade  [Riley's]  I  soon  ordered 
to  support  him."  (Ex.  Doc.  No.  1,  p.  309.) 

Major  John  L.  Smith,  senior  engineer,  says :  "Lieutenant  Stevens 
in  the  reconnaissance  of  the  position  of  Churubusco,  was  assisted 
by  Lieutenant  McClellan  and  escorted  by  the  company  of  sappers 
and  miners.  This  company  also  participated  in  the  operations  of 
the  right  [of  Twiggs's  division]  ".  (Ex.  Doc.  No.  1,  p.  353.) 

Major  Dimmick,  commanding  the  First  Regiment  of  Artillery, 
says :  "  About  12  o'clock,  M.,  the  battalion  was  ordered  to  attack 
the  position  of  the  enemy  at  the  church,  reported  by  the  engineers 
at  the  time  to  have  but  one  piece  of  artillery.  The  point  of  attack 
selected  by  the  senior  engineer  officer  was  masked  by  a  corn-field, 
in  front  of  which  I  deployed  the  battalion  and  ordered  it  to  ad 
vance,  when  [almost  instantly  a  shower  of  musketry,  grape  and 
round  shot  poured  upon  us,  under  which  the  battalion  advanced". 

"The  right  had  advanced  to  within  one  hundred  yards  of  a 
regular  bastion  front,  the  curtain  of  which  had  four  pieces  in  em 
brasure,  besides  nearly  a  thousand  infantry,  both  of  which  kept  up 
such  a  constant  stream  of  fire  that  I  could  not  advance  further  in 
line ;  I  therefore  ordered  the  men  to  cover  themselves  as  well  as 
possible.  The  left  of  the  battalion  advanced  to  within  seventy 


4G 

yards  of  the  work,  being  exposed  to  the  fire  of  two  pieces  of 
artillery,  en  barbette,  in  addition  to  the  fire  of  a  considerable  force 
of  infantry,  and  some  of  them  still  nearer,  so  that  they  had  a 
destructive  fire  on  the  cannoniers  and  infantry  ;  which  position 
the  battalion  maintained  until  the  enemy  were  driven  from  their 
guns  and  bastion,  when  they  were  followed  into  their  work  and 
surrendered."  (Ex.  Doc.  No.  1,  Appendix,  p.  78.) 

Captain  Francis  Taylor,  commanding  light  battery,  says:  "  On 
reaching  Churubusco,  we  came  in  sight  of  a  church,  where  the 
enemy  was  posted,  having,  as  was  supposed,  an  entrenched  battery 
thrown  across  the  road.  Troops  were  soon  thrown  forward  to  attack 
this  place ;  and,  after  a  short  time,  I  was  ordered  to  place  the  battery 
in  a  position  where  it  was  thought  I  could  drive  the  enemy  from 
the  roof  and  walls  of  the  church,  and  sustain  the  other  troops  in 
their  efforts  to  carry  this  place  by  storm.  On  taking  the  position 
assigned  me,  I  found  we  were  exposed  to  a  most  terrible  fire  of 
artillery  and  musketry,  of  a  regular  entrenchment,  covering  the 
front  of  the  church  to  which  we  were  opposite,  and  which  the 
intervening  Indian  corn  hid  from  our  sight  at  the  time.  Here  I 
opened  my  battery,  and  it  was  served  with  great  precision  for  about 
an  hour  and  a  half,  notwithstanding  it  was  exposed,  during  that 
time,  to  a  constant  shower  of  grape,  round  shot,  shell  and  musket 
ry.  At  last,  finding  my  loss  was  becoming  very  great,  and  having 
succeeded  in  driving  the  enemy  from  the  roof  and  walls  of  the 
church,  and  given  to  our  troops  such  support  as  was  in  my  power, 
I  determined  to  withdraw  the  pieces".  (  Ex.  Doc.  No.  1,  Appendix, 
p.  73). 

The  connection  between  the  reconnaissance  of  the  engineers, 
and  the  operations  of  the  First  Artillery  and  Taylor's  battery  at 
Churubusco,  has  already  been  described  in  extracts  taken  from  my 
official  report. 

In  his  official  report,  General  Persifor  F.  Smith  says:  "  Lieutenant 
G.  W.  Smith,  in  command  of  the  engineer  company,  and  Lieutenant 
McClellan,  his  subaltern,  distinguished  themselves  throughout  the 
whole  of  the  three  actions  [19th  and  20th  at  Contreras ;  and  at 
Churubusco].  Nothing  seemed  to  them  too  bold  to  be  undertaken, 
or  too  difficult  to  be  executed  ;  and  their  services  as  engineers  were  as 
valuable  as  those  they  rendered  in  battle  at  the  head-  of  their 
gallant  men.  Lieutenant  Foster,  being  detached  from  his  company 
during  the  action  at  Contreras,  did  not  fall  under  my  notice ;  but 
in  the  action  on  the  19th  and  at  Churubusco,  he  was  equally  con 
spicuous  for  his  gallantry  ".  (Ex.  Doc.  No.  1,  p.  332 ). 

General  Twiggs,   in  his  official  report,  says:     "To    Lieutenant 


47 

G.  W.  Smith,  of  the  engineers,  who  commanded  the  company  of 
sappers  and  miners,  I  am  under  obligations  for  his  services  on  this 
and  on  other  occasions.  Whenever  his  legitimate  duties  with 
the  pick  and  spade  were  performed,  he  always  solicited  permission 
to  join  in  the  advance  of  the  storming  party  with  his  muskets,  in 
which  position  his  gallantry,  and  that  of  his  officers  and  men,  was 
conspicuously  displayed  at  Contreras  as  well  as  Cerro  Gordo."  (Ex. 
Doc.  No.  1,  p.  325.) 


CHAPTER  V. 

CAPTURE   OF   THE  CITY   OF  MEXICO. 


During  the  armistice,  which  was  entered  into  just  after  the  battle 
of  Churubusco,  and  terminated  on  the  6th  of  September,  the  en 
gineer  company  was  quartered  in  the  village  of  San  Angel.  On 
the  7th  of  September  I  received  orders  to  move  the  company,  its 
train,  and  the  general  engineer  train  of  the  army  to  Tacubaya. 

MOLING  DEL  REY.  That  night  I  was  ordered  to  detail  an  officer 
and  ten  men  of  the  engineer  company  to  report  to  General  Worth. 
Lieutenant  Foster  was  placed  in  charge  of  this  detail.  He  and 
his  men  were  on  the  right  of  the  storming  party  of  five  hundred 
picked  men,  of  Worth's  division,  which  led  the  attack  against 
Molino  Del  Rey  on  the  morning  of  the  8th.  In  that  attack  Lieu 
tenant  Foster  was  very  severely  wounded  and  disabled. 

CHAPULTEPEC.  On  the  llth  of  September,  I  received  orders  to 
furnish  details  of  men  from  the  company  to  assist  engineer  officers 
in  supervising  the  construction  of  batteries  against  Chapultepec.  I 
was  placed  in  -charge  of  Battery  No.  1,  on  the  Tacubaya  road, 
against  the  southern  face  of  the  Castle ;  and  Lieutenant  McClellan 
in  charge  of  Battery  No.  2,  against  the  southwestern  angle.  On 
the  night  of  the  12th,  the  details  were  all  called  in,  arid  1  was 
directed  to  furnish  implements  to  the  different  storming  parties 
which  were  to  assault  the  castle  of  Chapultepec  on  the  morning 
of  the  13th. 

SAN  COSME  GARITA.  At  3  P.  M.,  that  day,  I  received  orders  to 
join  the  siege  train,  and  report  to  General  Worth  whose  column 
was  to  attack  the  city  by  the  San  Cosme  route. 

At  4  P.  M.,  I  reported  to  General  Worth,  who  was  then  with  his 
forces,  in  the  suburbs  of  the  city,  on  the  San  Cosme  causeway,  at 
the  point  where  it  changes  direction,  at  an  angle  of  nearly  ninety 
degrees,  and  is  then  nearly  straight  for  about  six  hundred  yards 
to  the  fortified  Garita  in  our  front.  He  informed  me  that  Lieu 
tenant  Stevens  had  just  been  severely  wounded  and  this  made  me 

(48) 


49 

the  senior  engineer  with  Worth's  division.  He  directed  me  to  go 
forward  in  person,  closely  examine  the  condition  of  affairs  at  the 
front,  endeavor  to  determine  the  best  method  of  operating  against 
the  fortified  Garita,  and  report  to  him  the  result  of  my  observa 
tions  as  soon  as  possible.  He  directed  me,  particularly,  to  have  in 
view  the  question  whether  it  would  be  advisable  to  bring  the  siege 
guns  forward  against  the  embrasured  battery  at  the  Garita.  Just 
as  I  was  leaving  him,  he  said  :  "  If  you  find  there  are  two  different 
methods  by  which  the  Garita  can  be  carried,  one  in  a  shorter  time 
at  a  sacrifice  of  men,  the  other  in  longer  time,  but  a  saving  of  men, 
choose  the  latter".  And  he  added :  "There  have  been  too  many 
valuable  lives,  of  officers  and  men,  lost  recently  in  my  division, 
for  nothing  ". 

Though  he  did  not  specify  the  action  referred  to,  he  meant  the 
battle  of  Molino  Del  Rey.  Under  these  instructions,  I  proceeded 
to  the  extreme  front,  made  the  requisite  examination  of  our 
position  and  that  of  the  enemy,  and  soon  come  back.  I  reported 
that" the  houses  on  the  left  of  the  causeway  were  built  up  continu 
ously  to  the  battery  at  the  Garita,  we  could  easily  break  through 
the  walls  from  house  to  house;  and,  under  perfect  cover,  reach  the 
top  of  a  three-story  building,  with  flat  roof  and  stone  parapet, 
within  40  yards  of  the  battery.  A  fire  of  musketry  from  that  roof 
would  make  the  works  untenable ;  and  we  could  thus  in  a  short 
time  drive  the  enemy  from  the  fortified  Garita,  and  secure  a  good 
lodgement  within  the  city,  without  material  loss  and  without  using 
the  siege  guns. 

General  Worth  directed  me  to  bring  forward  the  engineer  com 
pany,  which  was  with  the  siege  train  a  short  distance  to  the  rear, 
^and  commence  operations  ontthe  proposed  plan;  and  at  the  same 
time  ordered  that  Clarke's  brigade  should  render  any  assistance  I 
might  call  for. 

An  hour  or  more  before  sunset  we  reached  the  top  of  the  house 
above  referred  to.  From  that  position  the  inside  of  the  enemy's 
works  could  be  plainly  seen  almost  to  the  foot  of  the  interior  slope 
of  the  parapet.  Our  first  fire  upon  the  Mexicans,  who  were  uncon 
scious  of  the  impending  peril,  was  very  deadly.  Those  who  were 
not  killed  or  disabled  by  that  fire  seemed  dazed  for  an  instant;  but 
in  a  few  moments,  they  precipitately  retreated,  leaving  the  San 
Cosine  Garita  without  a  single  defender  in  the  works.  One  of  their 
pieces  of  artillery  was  withdrawn  a  few  hundred  yards,  but  was 
then  abandoned. 

Immediately  after  that  first  fire,  a  portion  of  the  force  with  me 
on  the  roof  became  engaged  with  the  enemy  who  appeared  on 


house  tops  in  rear  of  their  battery.  We  soon  drove  them  from 
their  position.  The  other  portion  of  our  men  fell  back  to  the  stairs, 
made  their  way  to  the  lower  story,  broke  open  the  thick,  heavily 
barred,  strong  door,  passed  into  the  street,  entered  the  abandoned 
works,  and  pursued  the  enemy.  In  the  meantime,  some  of  our 
troops  from  the  right  of  the  causeway  had  come  forward  and,  a 
very  small  number  of  them,  were  slightly  in  advance  of  us  in 
reaching  the  abandoned  battery. 

Colonel  Garland,  commander  of  the  first  brigade  of  Worth's 
division,  on  the  right  of  the  causeway,  says,  in  his  official  report : 
"  The  enemy  then  took  position  at  the  Garita  San  Cosme,  where 
they  were  supported  by  two  pieces  of  artillery  which  raked  the 
streets  with  grape  and  canister.  Finding  a  secure  position  to  the 
right  of  the  second  defence,  [about  350  yards  in  front  of  the  Gar 
ita],  I  reorganized  the  command  as  it  came  up  ;  mounted  a  howitzer 
on  the  top  of  a  convent,  which,  under  the  direction  of  Lieutenant 
[U.  S.]  Grant,  Quartermaster,  4th  Infantry,  and  Lieutenant  Len- 
drum,  3rd  Artillery,  annoyed  the  enemy  considerably.  About  this 
time,  report  was  made  to  me  that  considerable  progress  had  been 
made  by  the  troops  on  the  other  side  of  the  street  by  means  of 
crowbars  and  pickaxes,  working  through  houses  and  yards.  This 
caused  me  to  watch  closely  for  the  first  movement  of  the  enemy  in 
dicative  of  retreat.  The  moment  this  was  discovered,  the  4th 
Infantry,  followed  by  detachments  of  the  2nd  and  3rd  Artillery, 
under  Colonel  Belton,  rushed  up  the  road,  when  they  entered  the 
work  simultaneously  with  the  forces  operating  to  the  right  and  left, 
Captain  McKenzie's  storming  party  slightly  in  advance".  (Ex. 
Doc.  No.  1,  Appendix,  p.  170. ) 

Referring  to  this  operation,  General  Worth,  in  his  official  report, 
says;  "the  moment  had  now  arrived  for  the  final  and  combined 
attack  upon  the  last  stronghold  of  the  enemy  in  my  quarter ;  it 
was  made,  by  our  men  springing,  as  if  by  magic,  to  the  tops  of  the 
houses  into  which  they  had  patiently  and  quietly  made  their  way 
with  the  bar  and  pick,  and  to  the  utter  surprise  and  consternation 
of  the  enemy,  opening  upon  him,  within  easy  range,  a  destructive 
fire  of  musketry.  A  single  discharge,  in  which  many  of  his  gun 
ners  were  killed  at  their  pieces,  was  sufficient  to  drive  him  in 
confusion  from  the  breastworks;  when  a  prolonged  shout  from  our 
brave  fellows  announced  that  we  were  in  possession  of  the  Garita 
of  San  Cosme,  and  already  in  the  city  of  Mexico  ".  (  Ex.  Doc.  No. 
1,  p.  392.) 

The  American  army  having  thus  captured  the  fortifications  of 
the  capital  of  the  enemy's  country,  a  magnificent  city  of  nearly 


51 

200.000  inhabitants,  a  secure  lodgement  was  immediately  effected  in 
large  houses,  on  the  left  of  the  street,  a  few  hundred  yards  from 
the  Garita.  I  then  proceeded,  with  the  engineer  company  and  an 
infantry  detachment,  several  hundred  yards  farther;  and  found  a 
strong  position,  on  the  right  of  the  street  where  the  troops  could 
rest  protected  from  fire.  Going  farther  to  the  front,  I  discovered 
that,  150  yards  in  advance  there  was  a  large  convent,  on  the  left  of 
the  street,  occupied  by  a  strong  force.  The  next  cross  street,  the 
Paseo,  had  batteries  upon  it.  These  facts  were  reported  to  General 
Worth,  who  ordered  forward  two  brigades — one  to  occupy  each  of 
of  the  positions  selected — and,  directed  me  to  place  those  troops, 
station  the  picket-guards,  and  then,  with  Lieutenant  McClellan, 
report  at  his  headquarters  which  was  several  hundred  yards  within 
the  Garita. 

The  aqueduct,  in  the  middle  of  the  street  along  which  we  ad 
vanced,  was  an  open  stone  trough,  supported  at  a  height  of  ten 
feet,  or  more,  by  pillars  and  arches.  There  was  a  good  deal  of 
firing  down  the  street  from  Mexican  detachments;  but,  by  taking 
shelter  under  the  arches,  between  the  pillars,  our  men,  in  small 
groups,  were  quite  well  protected.  A  little  before  dark,  whilst  I 
was  under  one  of  the  arches  at  the  extreme  ffarit,  endeavoring  to 
get  a  closer  view  of  the  enemy  at  the  convent  and  on  the  Paseo,  I 
was  joined  by  Lieutenant  Sydney  Smith,  of  the  Fourth  Infantry, 
who  had  borne  several  messages  from  me  to  General  Worth  during 
the  afternoon.  In  a  few  moments  after  he  joined  me  we  heard 
horses  feet  rapidly  approaching  us  from  the  direction  of  the  citadel. 
These  horsemen  were  'captured,  and  proved  to  be  three  Mexican 
officers,  one  of  whom  was  Adjutant-General  on  the  staff  of  Santa 
Anna. 

Accompanied  by  Lieutenant  McClellain,  I  -reported  to  General 
Worth  at  10  P.  M.,  and  was  ordered  by  him  to  suspend  operations 
for  the  night  and  resume  them  at  daylight.  He  received  us  both 
very  kindly,  expressed  satisfaction  with  the  manner  in  whichthe 
works  at  the  Garita  had  been  carried,  and  approved  of  all  the  dis 
positions  that  had  been  subsequently  made  of  the  troops  at  the 
front.  I  called  his  attention  again  to  the  convent,  told  him  that 
the  large  Mexican  force  in  that  position  might  give  us  a  great  deal 
of  trouble  next  morning,  and  asked  him  to  permit  me,  with  the 
engineer  company  supported  by  a  detachment  of  about  five  hundred 
men,  to  pass  the  convent  that  night,  get  into  a  strong  position  be 
yond  it,  and  thus  induce  the  enemy  to  abandon  that  position  before 
morning;  and  said  I  thought  it  probable  a  detachment  of  five 
hundred  men  could  reach  the  main  plaza  of  the  city,  that  night, 


52 

without  material  difficulty  ;  and  that,  in  case  this  force  encountered 
serious  opposition,  they  could  take  posession  of  some  one  of  the 
many  large,  strong  buildings  on  the  way,  and  hold  their  own 
against  the  whole  Mexican  army  until  relief  could  reach  them. 

General  Worth  not  only  refused  to  comply  with  my  request ;  but, 
ordered  both  myself  and  Lieutenant  McClellan  to  remain  at  his 
headquarters  until  3  A.  M.  ,  at  which  hour  he  said  he  would  have 
us  called,  and  we  could  then  go  to  the  front  and  resume  our  duties. 

That  arrangement  left  the  engineer  company,  for  the  night,  at 
the  extreme  front,  without  an  officer.  ,  In  spite  of  my  earnest  re 
monstrances  General  Worth  insisted  that  we  should  remain.  On  the 
latter  point  he  was  inexorable.  I  finally  asked  him  if  I  wras  under 
arrest.  He  said  "  No  "  and  added  :  "  You  soon  will  be  if  you  show- 
further  hesitation  in  obeying  my  order  for  you  to  remain  here  ". 

Being  awakened  by  one  of  General  Worth's  aides,  I  asked  if  it 
was  already  3  o'clock.  It  seemed  to  me  that  I  had  not  been  asleep 
five  minutes.  The  aide  said  :  "  It  is  about  1  o'clock.  A  deputation 
from  the  civil  authorities  has  just  informed  General  Worth  that 
Santa  Anna's  army  evacuated  the.  city  before  midnight,  and  they 
offered  to  surrender  the  city.  They  have  been  passed  on  to  General 
Scott,  at  Tacubaya ;  and  General  Worth  wishes  to  see  you  at  once ''. 

The  latter  told  me  more  fully  about  the  deputation  and  their 
proposal  to  surrender;  expressed  some  doubt  in  reference  to  the 
evacuation  of  the  city  by  the  Mexican  army  ;  directed  me  to  return 
to  the  front;  take  the  engineer  company  and  a  detachment  of 
infantry;  proceed  carefully  forward,  using  every  precaution;  and 
report  to  him  the  slightest  indication  that  the  city  had  not  been 
evacuated.  I  was  directed  to  examine  closely  every  large  building 
and  strong  position  along  our  route;  and  not  pass  them  until 
thoroughly  satisfied  that  they  were  not  occupied  by  Mexican 
soldiers. 

This  forward  movement  commenced  about  2  A.  M.  There  was 
some  delay  in  determining  whether  the  strong  convent,  mentioned 
above,  had  been  evacuated.  Accounts  on  that  subject  were  con 
flicting  ;  but  a  thorough  examination  of  the  whole  position  showed 
that  it  was  abandoned.  I  reported  that  fact  to  General  Worth,  and 
informed  him  that  we  would  move  on  with  great  care,  in  strict 
compliance  with  his  instructions. 

All  buildings  of  importance  were  broken  open.  None  of  them 
were  occupied  by  the  enemy.  From  time  to  time,  I  reported  these 
facts  to  General  Worth  ;  and,  at  daylight,  I  informed  him  that, 
from  a  church  steeple  near  the  Alameda,  I  could  see  that  the  Cita 
del,  which  had  stopped  the  advance  of  General  Quitman's  troops 


53 

earl}'  in  the  afternoon  of  the  13th,  was  deserted.  At  that  time, 
Lieutenaat  McClellan  reported  to  me  there  were  no  signs  of  the 
enemy  in  any  portion  of  the  Alameda;  and  I  suggested  to  General 
Worth  that  his  whole  division  be  moved  forward. 

In  the  meantime,  with  the  engineer  company  and  the  infantry 
detachment,  Ij)assed  beyond  the  Alameda,  breaking  open,  as  before, 
and  examining  all  strong  buildings  on  our  route.  We  had  gone 
more  than  two  blocks  in  advance  of  the  Alameda,  and  were  closely 
approaching  the  Main  Plaza  and  the  National  Palace,  when  I  re 
ceived  a  positive  order  to  countermarch  my  command,  and  report 
to  General  Worth  at  the  Alameda.  1  demurred,  and  told  the  aide, 
who  bore  the  order,  that  I  had  obeyed  all  of  General  Worth's 
cautionary  instructions  ;  that  there  was  no  enemy  in  our  front,  and 
no  reason  for  calling  us  back.  The  aide  replied  :  "The  order  is 
positive.  You  must  go  back."  I  then  gave  the  order  to  counter 
march.  On  our  way,  the  aide,  who  was  a  classmate  and  intimate 
friend  of  mine,  said  to  me;  "General  Worth  is  very  cross,  he  is 
angry.  My  opinion  is  that  he  has  received  orders  from  the  head 
quarters  of  the  army  which  have  riled  him  up  badly  ". 

A  few  days  later  I  learned  from  General  Worth  that  he  received 
a  peremptory  order  from  General  Scott  not  to  permit  any  one  under 
his  command  to  pass  beyond  the  Alameda,  until  further  instructions 
were  received  from  the  General-in-Chief. 

For  several  hours  after  the  engineer  company  took  its  place  on 
the  right  of  Worth's  division,  at  the  Alameda,  all  seemed  to  be 
quiet  in  the  city.  General  Quitman's  troops,  from  the  Belen  Gate, 
had  passed  the  abandoned  citadel,  reached  the  Main  Plaza,  and 
took  possession  of  the  National  Palace.  Later,  General  Scott,  with 
his  staff  officers  and  mounted  escort,  entered  the  city. 

About  that  time  a  shot  was  fired,  evidently  aimed  at  General 
Worth,  from  a  narrow  street  or  lane,  opposite  the  head  of  the 
division.  The  shot  missed  Worth,  but  very  severely  wounded 
Colonel  Garland.  General  Worth,  immediately  ordered  me  to  take 
the  engineer  company,  go  into  the  lane,  find  the  man  who  fired  the 
shot,  and  hang  him. 

Within  fifty  yards  we  found  the  man  who  I  believed  fired  the 
shot,  a  rope  was  placed  around  his  neck,  but  I  did  not  order  my 
men  to  hang  him.  I  had  no  positive  proof  against  him.  I  took  the 
man  to  General  Worth,  reported  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  in 
full ;  stated  the  reasons  for  my  belief  that  the  prisoner  fired  the 
shot  which  severely  wounded  Colonel  Garland;  and  added :  "In 
the  absence  of  specific  proof  against  this  man  I  have  brought  him 
to  you,  and  await  your  further  instructions  ". 


54 

To  which  General  Worth  replied,  in  a  cold  and  haughty  manner: 
"  This  is  not  the  way  in  which  my  orders  are  obeyed  by  officers  of 
my  division  ". 

Colonel  Duncan,  who  was  close  beside  General  Worth,  both 
mounted,  whilst  I  was  on  foot,  said,  at  once,  before  I  could  make 
any  reply  to  the  foregoing  censure:  "  General  Worth,  you  are 
wrong;  Lieutenant  Smith  is  right.  Under  the  circumstances  he 
ought  not  to  have  hanged  this  man.  It  is  for  you,  the  Major-Gen- 
eral  commanding  these  forces,  to  decide  that  matter.  Give  the  order. 
You  see  he  and  his  men  are  ready  to  obey  you.  Give  the  order". 

In  the  meantime,  the  men  of  the  engineer  company,  without 
instructions  from  me,  -had  passed  the  rope  over  ar\  adjacent  large 
lantern  iron  ;  and  stood  ready  to  string  the  man  up.  General 
Worth  did  not  give  the  order.  The  man  was  not  hanged.^ 

In  less  than  an  hour  after  Colonel  Garland-was  wounded,  lawless 
bands  of  armed  Mexicans  commenced  firing  from  the  parapet  roofs 
of  houses,  from  church  steeples  and  windows,  in  various  parts  of 
the  city,  upon  our  troops  in  the  open  streets.  An  order  was  then 
given,  by  General  Scott,  for  Worth's  forces  to  move  beyond  the 
Alameda  and  join  with  the  rest  of  the  army,  in  putting  down  the 
rising  of  armed  outlaws  who  made  this  murderous  attack  upon  us 
eight  or  ten  hours  after  the  city  surrendered.  In  these  operations 
the  engineer  company  was  with  Worth's  division  until  the  recall 
was  sounded  late  that  afternoon. 

General  Scott,  in  his  official  report,  says  :  "  I  communicated,  about 
daylight  [on  the  14th],  orders  to  Worth  and  Quitman  to  advance 
slowly  and  cautiously  [to  guard  against  treachery]  towards  the 
heart  of  the  city,  and  to  occupy  its  stronger  and  more  commanding 
points.  Quitman  proceeded  to  the  great  plaza  or  square,  planted 
guards  and  hoisted  the  colors  of  the  United  States  on  the  national 
palace,  containing  the  halls  of  Congress  and  executive  apartments 
of  Federal  Mexico.  In  this  grateful  service,  Quitman  might  have 
been  anticipated  by  Worth,  but  for  my  express  orders  halting  the 
latter  at  the,  head  of  the  Alameda,  [a  green  park]  within  three 
squares  of  that  goal  of  general  ambition".  (Ex.  Doc.  No.  1,  p. 


General  Worth,  in  his  official  report,  says  :  "  At  5  A.  M.,  on  the 
14th,  my  troops  and  heavy  guns  advanced  into  the  city,  and  occu 
pied  the  Alameda  to  the  point  where  it  fronts  the  palace,  and  there 
halted  at  0  o'clock,  the  general-iii-chief  having  instructed  me  to 
take  a  position  and  await  his  further  orders.  Shortly  afterwards  a 
straggling  assassin-like  fire  commenced  from  the  house-tops,  which 
continued,  in  various  parts  of  the  city  through  the  day,  causing  us 


55 

some  loss.  The  first  shot,  fired  at  a  group  of  officers  at  the  head  of 
my  column,  struck  down  Colonel  Garland,  badly  wounded.  About 
the  time  of  our  entrance  into  the  city,  the  convicts  in  the  different 
prisons,  to  the  number  of  some  thirty  thousand  men,  were  liberated 
by  order  of  the  flying  government,  armed  and  distributed  in  the 
most  advantageous  houses,  including  the  churches,  convents,  and 
even  the  hospitals,  for  the  purpose  of  exciting,  if  possible,  the  city 
to  revolt  ". 

In  speaking  of  the  general  operations  of  his  forces  in  the  capture 
of  the  city,  General  Worth  adds: 

"  Officers  and  men  of  every  corps  carried  themselves  with  wonted 
gallantry  and  conduct.  Of  the  staff;  Lieutenants  Stevens,  Smith, 
and  McClellan,  engineers,  displayed  the  gallantry,  skill  and  conduct, 
which  so  eminently  distinguished  their  corps".  (Ex.  Doc.  No.  1, 
pp.  393-4.) 

General  Scott  adds:  "Captain  Lee,  engineer,  so  constantly  dis 
tinguished,  also  bore  important  orders  from  me  [September  13] 
until  he  fainted  from  a  wound  and  the  loss  of  two  nights'  sleep  at 
the  batteries.  Lieutenants  Beauregard,  Stevens,  and  Tower,  all 
wounded,  were  employed  with  the  divisions,  and  Lieutenants  G.  W. 
Smith  and  G.  B.  McClellan  with  the  company  of  sappers  and  miners. 
Those  five  lieutenants  of  engineers,  like  their  captain,  won  the 
admiration  of  all  about  them  ".  (Ex.  Doc.  No.  1,  p.  385.) 

Major  John  L.  Smith,  senior  engineer,  says  :  "  Lieutenant  Smith 
reports  all  the  sappers  who  were  engaged  on  the  13th  and  14th,  to 
have  conducted  themselves  with  intelligence  and  intrepidity  alto 
gether  satisfactory  ;  but,  he  mentions  the  orderly  sergeant,  Hastings, 
who  was  wounded,  as  being  eminently  distinguished,  and  he 
mentions  also  artificer  Gerber,  as  having  been  particularly  dis 
tinguished  ".  (Ex.  Doc.  No.  1,  p.  430.) 

Without  dwelling  upon  details  of  the  fighting  in  the  streets  and 
houses  on  the  14th,  it  may  be  stated  that,  a  short  time  before  the 
recall  was  sounded,  when  Orderly  Sergeant  Hastings  fell,  Lieu 
tenant  McClellan  seized  the  Sergeant's  musket,  fired  at,  and  killed 
the  man  who  shot  Hastings.  In  a  few  moments  thereafter  the  com 
pany  passed  the  dead  body  of  that  "  liberated  ",  convict  Mexican. 

The  unoccupied  private  house  in  which  we  were  quartered  that 
night  was  near  the  place  at  which  the  man,  who  shot  Colonel 
Garland,  had  been  left  tied  to  a  lantern  iron  with  a  rope  around 
his  neck.  When  we  returned  the  man  was  gone.  Nothing  further 
was  said  or  done  upon  our  side,  in  his  case. 

An  hour  or  more  after  we  were  comfortably  "  settled  in  our  new 
home'',  I  noticed  that  McClellan  was  very  quiet  for  a  considerable 


w 

time,  evidently  thinking  of  matters  which  deeply  interested  him. 
An  occasional  marked  change  seemed  to  come  over  the  spirit  of 
his  dream.  Finally  I  awakened  him  from  his  reverie,  saying:  "A 
penny  for  your  thoughts.  I  have  been  watching  you  for  half  an 
hour  or  more,  and  would  like  much  to  know,  honor  bright,  what 
you  have  been  thinking  about". 

To  which  he  replied:  "I  have  been  making  a  *  general  review  ' 
of  what  we  have  gone  through  since  we  left  West  Point,  one  year 
ago  this  month,  bound  for  the  *  Halls  of  the  Montezumas"';  have 
been  again  on  the  Rio  Grande,  that  grave-yard  of  our  forces  ;  have 
gone  over  the  road  from  Matamoros  toVictoria  and  Tampico,  where 
we  had  so  much  hard  work;  went  through  the  siege  of  Vera  Cruz, 
where  we  were  left  out  in  the  cold  during  the  ceremonies  of  sur 
render,  and  later,  had  to  make  our  way  as  best  we  could,  with  the 
engineer  train  through  the  horrid  sand;  glanced  at  Cern>  Gordo, 
where  it  was  my  misfortune  to  be  with  General  Pillow's  '  whipped 
community ';  stopped  again  with  our  friends,  the  Monks,  in  the 
convent  at  Puebla ;  crossed  over  the  mountains;  came  by  *  way  of 
San  Antonio,  Contreras,  Churubusco,  Chapultepec  and  the  San 
Cosme  Garita,  into  this  city.  Here  we  are — the  deed  is  done — I  am 
glad  no  one  can  say  '  poor  Mac '  over  me  ". 

t  The  capture  of  the  city,  and  its  occupation  by  General  Scott's 
army,  virtually  ended  the  war  made  by  the  United  States  against 
Mexico. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

IN   THE  CITY  OF  MEXICO— RETURN   TO   WEST   POINT. 


After  the  street  fighting  on  the  14th,  the  city  was  quiet  and  re 
mained  so.  The  men  of  the  company  were  fairly  entitled  to  a  good 
rest  and  a  new  outfit  of  clothing ;  but  the  quartermaster  could  not 
then  furnish  the  latter.  At  their  request,  I  authorized  them  to 
purchase  a  better  quality  of  cloth  than  that  furnished  by  the  gov 
ernment,  and  to  have  finer  material  for  trimmings  than  the  coarse 
cotton  braid  allowed  by  the  regulations.  The  clothing  was  made 
by  good  tailors  and  paid  for  by  the  men.  In  the  course  of  a  month 
or  six  weeks,  the  company  was  provided  with  handsome,  well-fitting 
uniforms. 

In  the  meantime,  drills  wrere  suspended  for  about  a  month. 
During  that  period  the  only  duty  required  of  the  men,  other  than 
that  of  ordinary  guard  over  their  quarters  and  the  engineer  train 
of  the  army,  was  that  of  details  to  assist  engineer  officers  in  making 
surveys  of  the  recent  battle-fields. 

In  the  latter  part  of  October,  the  surveys  of  the  battle-fields 
being  completed,  and  the  men  provided  with  new  aad  well-fitting 
uniforms,  infantry  drills  were  resumed.  An  order  was  issued  re 
quiring  the  company  to  be  formed  without  arms,  the  next  day,  in 
the  Alameda,  for  squad  drill.  Immediately  thereafter,  one  of  my 
most  trusted  sergeants  informed  me  that  this  order  caused  great 
dissatisfaction  in  the  company.  He  said  the  men  felt  they  would 
be  degraded  if  now  turned  back  to  the  beginning — at  squad  drill 
without  arms — thus  placing  them  in  the  position  of  raw  recruits, 
whilst  the  rest  of  the  army  were  being  exercised  at  brigade  and 
division  drill,  "evolutions  of  the  line,"  with  all  attendant  "pomp 
and  circumstance". 

'  The  sergeant  warned  me  that  the  state  of  feeling  in  the  company 
would,  in  his  opinion,  lead  to  serious  trouble  if  the  order  was 
carried  into  effect,  I  thanked  him  for  the  information. 

When  the  men  were  formed  on  the  drill  ground  next  day,  I  told 

(57) 


58 

them  I  was  aware  of  their  opposition  to  the  order ;  but,  that  I  was 
under  the  impression  I  commanded  that  company,  and  if  there 
was  a  man  amongst  them  who  felt  disposed  to  dispute  my  legal 
authority  he  was  requested  to  step  to  the  front.  No  one  moved.  I 
then  directed  the  artificers  and  privates  to  go  to  their  quarters,  and 
inform  the  sergeant  of  the  guard  they  had  my  permission  to  be 
absent  until  evening  parade.  Turning  to  the  non-commissioned 
officers,  I  stated  that,  in  my  judgment,  there  was  no  occasion  for 
them  to  feel  degraded  if  drilled  by  their  own  officers  at  squad  drill 
without  arms. 

I  drilled  the  sergeants,  McClellan  the  corporals.  Whilst  the 
non-commissioned  officers  were  being  thus  drilled,  the  men  were 
allowed  daily  liberty  from  quarters.  Later,  the  non-commissioned 
officers  drilled  the  men  in  squads  under  the  supervision  of  the 
officers.  Instruction  and  practice  in  the  infantry  "  School  of  the 
Company  "  was  then  resumed ;  and,  after  a  time,  each  non-com 
missioned  officer  was  required,  in  turn,  to  take  his  place  by  my 
side  and  drill  the  company.  On  those  occasions,  the  men  were 
warned  that  no  inattention  or  remissness  on  their  part  would  be 
tolerated ;  no  matter  how  lenient  with  them  I  might  choose  to  be 
when  commanding  in  person. 

It  is  safe  to  say  that  within  six  weeks  from  the  time  squad  drills 
without  arms  were  commenced  in  the  engineer  company,  in  the 
City  of  Mexico,  that  company  as  Infantry,  was  better  drilled  than 
anj7  other  in  the  army.  In  that  respect,  and  in  discipline,  they 
were  pattern  soldiers.  Regular  instruction  in  the  "  School  of  the 
Engineer  Soldier"  was  then  resumed. 

From  raw  recruits,  on  the  Rio  Grande,  disturbed  by  the  epithet, 
"pick  and  shovel  brigade"  applied  to  them,  at  that  time,  by  the 
soldiers  of  the  line,  the  engineer  company  had  become  veterans  of 
more  than  half  a  dozen  important  battles;  had  always  been  in  the 
front  of  the  fighting;  and  had  often  been  called  upon  to  direct 
large  working  parties  of  soldiers,  detailed  to  use  the  "  pick  and 
shovel ". 

About  two  months  after  we  entered  the  city  of  Mexico,  it  was 
reported  to  me,' by  the  sergeant  of  the  guard,  that  Artificer  Gerber 
was  then  absent,  two  hours  beyond  the  time  limit  of  his  pass.  I 
directed  the  sergeant  to  send  Gerber  to  me,  in  my  quarters,  as  soon 
as  he  returned. 

Frederick  W.  Gerber  was  one  of  the  four  men,  enlisted  by  Captain 
Swift,  who  had  served  in  the  old  regular  army.  He  was  enlisted 
as  musician,  and  was  the  finest  bugler  in  the  service.  He" was  soon 
made  company  clerk,  and  had  thorough  knowledge  of  routine 


51) 

"company  papers''.  lie  was  German  by  birth.  As  company  clerk 
his  duties  brought  him  in  close  relations  with  the  commander  of 
the  company;  and  I  soon  formed  a  very  high  estimate  of  his  qual 
ities  as  a  soldier — and  as  a  man  in  every  respect;  except  that  he 
would,  on  occasion,  at  intervals,  when  off  duty,  indulge  too  freely 
in  strong  drink. 

I  had  repeatedly  threatened  to  deprive  him  of  his  warrant  as 
artificer,  if  he  did  not  quit  drinking  to  excess;  but  I  was  reluctant 
to  do  so,  especially  because  his  promotion  to  that  grade  was  in  re 
ward  for  distinguished  gallantry  in  the  attack  on  the  "  key-point" 
of  the  Mexican  position  at  the  battle  of  Cerro  Gordo. 

When  it  was  reported  to  me  that  he  had  not  returned  within  the 
time  of  his  "  pass  ",  I  was  quite  sure  he  was  again  "  on  a  spree  ".  It 
\vas  several  hours  later  when  he  reported  to  me  as  ordered  by  the 
sergeant  of  the  guard. 

I  was  alone  when  he  entered  my  room.  He  had  evidently  been 
drinking  to  excess;  but  was  to  some  extent  recovering.  I  charged 
him  with  being  drunk ;  told  him  he  had  behaved  so  well  in  that 
respect  lately  that  I  had  made  up  my  mind  to  recommend  his 
being  promoted  to  the  grade  of  corporal;  and  even  to  that  of 
sergeant,  when  opportunity  was  afforded  me,  and  added:  "You 
know  1  cannot  make  such  recommendation  whilst  you  continue 
this  habit  of  getting  drunk  ".  He  replied  :  "  The  lieutenant  is  mis 
taken  ;  1  am  not  drunk,  and,  if  he  will  allow  me,  I  will  satisfy  him 
on  that  point;  and  explain  to  him  how  I  happened  to  overstay 
any  pass  ".  I  told  him  to  go  on  with  his  explanation. 

He  said  that  soon  after  he  left  the  company  quarters,  early  that 
morning,  with  permission  to  be  absent  for  four  hours,  he  met  with 
a  sergeant  he  had  known  as  a  private  in  the  old  regular  service 
long  before  the  war.  They  were  glad  to  see  each  other,  took  a  few 
drinks,  and  then  hired  a  carriage  for  a  drive  of  several  hours  in 
the  great  city  they  had  helped  to  capture.  He  added  :  "  During 
the  drive  the  sergeant  got  mad  and  threatened  to  have  me  arrested. 

I  told  him  that  '  no  d d  infantry  sergeant  had  rank  enough  to 

arrest  an  artificer  of  engineers '.  He  then  offered  to  fight  me.  We 
stopped  the  carriage,  got  out,  drew  our  swords,  and  I  told  him  to 
come  on,  and  we  would  soon  settle  the  matter.  Pie  attacked  me, 
and  I  disarmed  him,  kept  his  sword,  made  him  get  into  the  carriage, 
drove  to  General  Twiggs's  headquarters,  reported  to  the  sergeant 
of  his  guard,  told  him  what  had  occurred;  and  asked  him  to  hold, 
as  a  prisoner,  the  sergeant  that  had  attacked  me  ". 

"  But  he,  being  also  an  infantry  sergeant,  released  the  sergeant  I 
had  brought  there,  made  me  a  prisoner,  and  demanded  my  sword. 


I  gave  it  to  him ;  but,  when  he  ordered  me  to  give  up  the  sword  I 

had  captured,  I  told  him  I  would  see  him  d d  first;  and  I  kept 

it.      I  then  asked  to  be  taken  before  General  Twiggs.      They  told 
me  he  was  out". 

"  In  three  or  four  hours  General  Twiggs  returned,  and  when  he 
was  passing  through  the  sally-port,  the  guard  all  in  line,  at  pre 
sent-arms,  saluting  him  ;  I  rushed  in  front  of  his  horse,  and  calling 
him  by  name,  told  him  his  guard  had  made  me  a  prisoner,  and  I 
asked  for  justice  at  his  hands.  He  ordered  me  to  get  out  of  his 
way.  Still  standing  in  front  of  his  horse,  I  again  asked  for  justice. 
To  which  he  replied:  '  Who  in  the  h-11  are  you?'  When  I  told 
him  who  I  was,  he  said  :  '  How  is  it  that  you  are  a  prisoner  in  my 
guard-house? '  I  told  General  Twiggs  the  whole  story :  and  showed 
him  the  infantry  Sergeant's  sword  I  had  captured ;  and  which  his 
guard  tried  to  make  me  give  up.  General  Twiggs  then  asked  me 
if  I  was  willing  to  hand  that  sword  to  him.  I  gave  it  to  him  at 
once;  and  he  ordered  the  sergeant  of  the  guard  to  release  me  and 
give  me  back  my  own  sword.  I  then  came  straight  home.'' 

After  hearing  Gerber's  story,  on  which  I  placed  implicit  reliance, 
I  strongly  advised  him  to  let  liquor  alone  in  future:  and,  again 
told  him  I  would  gladly  have  him  promoted,  if  he  would  quit 
drinking. 

Some  time  after  we  returned  to  the  United  States,  and  I  had  left 
the  company,  I  learned  that,  during  the  time  Gerber  was  closeted 
with  me,  opinion  in  the  company  was  divided,  and  ran  high  in  re 
gard  to  the  course  I  would  take  in  his  case.  All  the  men  knew  that 
he  was  deservedly  a  great  favorite  of  mine,  Some  of  them  said 
I  would  let  him  off;  others  that  I  would  deprive  him  of  his 
warrant  as  artificer,  and  otherwise  punish  him. 

These  conflicting  opinions  as  to  what  I  would  do  in  Gerber's 
case,  were  freely  backed  by  heavy  bets  among  the  men.  When  he 
joined  them,  all  were  anxious  to  know  what  "the  lieutenant"  was 
going  to  do— "  what  did  he  say?"  To  which  he  replied:  "It  is 
none  of  your  business".  For  some  time  they  could  get  nothing 

more  from  him.     But  he  finally  said  :  "  I) n   it,  if  you   must 

know;  the  lieutenant  told  me  he  would  make  me  a  corporal". 

The  sergeant  who  gave  me  the  facts  just  related,  added :  "  Previous 
to  that  time,  Gerber  was  believed,  by  the  whole  company,  to  be  a 
perfectly  truthful  man.  But  many  of  the  men  thought  he  lied  on 
that  occasion.  Although  he  has  been  truthful  ever  since,  there  is 
still,  amongst  us,  very  grave  suspicion  in  regard  to  the  correctness 
of  his  assertion  that  vou  then  told  him  you  would  make  him  a 


01 

corporal.  I  would  like  very  much  to  know  the  truth  in  regard  to 
that  matter".  I  replied:  "Gerber  told  the  truth  ". 

It  will  be  shown  later,  by  extracts  from  official  correspondence, 
that  I  was  not  permitted  to  recommend  for  promotion,  in  the  com 
pany,  any  of  the  gallant  men  under  my  command  who  were  so 
highly  distinguished  in  the  various  battles  that  occurred  in  the 
Valley  of  Mexico.  So  I  had  no  opportunity  to  have  Gerber  made 
a  corporal — much  less  a  sergeant.* 

The  following  extracts  from  correspondence,  and  from  my  month- 
\j  reports,  give  a  brief  official  account  of  the  affairs  of  the  company 
after  the  capture  of  the  City  of  Mexico. 

On  the  4th  of  October,  1847,  I  addressed  to  Lieutenant  I.  I. 
Stevens,  Adjutant  of  Engineers,  for  the  information  of  the  senior 
engineer  in  the  field,  and  the  General  in  Chief,  a  letter  from  which 
the  following  quotations  are  taken : 

"By  the  last  advices  that  I  have  received  I  learn  that  only  six 
engineer  recruits  have  been  made  in  the  United  States  since  Sep 
tember,  1846.  During  that  time  the  effective  strength  of  the  com 
pany  in  the  field  has  been  reduced  from  seventy-one  to  thirty-six. 
Something  must  be  done.  I  have  endeavored  to  reenlist  good  men 
whose  terms  of  enlistment  in  other  corps  had  expired  ;  I  have  tried 
to  get  transfers  of  good  men,  and  succeeded  in  obtaining  but  one. 
The  senior  engineer,  believing  that  more  could  be  done,  attempted 
it  himself — he  procured  none". 

"At  Vera  Cruz  my  men  were  worked  too  hard;  many  of  them 
are  suffering  yet  from  disease  contracted  there.  Time,  labor  and 
life  would  have  been  saved  if  we  had  had  the  proportion  of  en 
gineer  soldiers  usual  in  the  armies  of  civilized  nations.  At  Cerro 
Gordo,  when  I  could  furnish  ten  men  [for  details],  fifty,  at  least, 
were  necessary.  In  the  operations  in  this  valley,  the  same  necessity 
has  been  felt  for  a  larger  number  of  soldiers  of  this  character. 
There  ought  to  be  more  companies  of  engineer  soldiers  in  this 
army.  Certainly,  measures  should  be  taken  to  complete  the  num 
ber  of  men  allowed  in  the  only  company  now  authorized.  'I  know 
of  none  so  likely  to  succeed  as  sending  an  officer  and  non-commis 
sioned  officers  [to  the  United  States]  on  this  duty  ". 

In  my  official  report  for  the  month  of  November,  1847,  it  is 
stated:  "The  system  of  instruction  now  being  pursued  is  the  fol 
lowing  :  From  9  A.  M.  until  10:45  A.  M.,  recitations  and  instruction 

*  Frederick  W.  Gerber,  was  enlisted  in  Co.  "A,"  June  29,  1846,  after  previous  service  in  the 
4th  Infantry,  which  he  joined  in  1839,  and  under  the  Act  of  March  8,  1849,  was  discharged 
April  (J  1849  He  was  reenlisted  the  same  day  and  continued  in  the  service  until  his  death  at 
the  Post  of  Willets  Point,  N.  Y.,  November  10,  1875.  He  was  appointed  Artificer,  April  18, 
1847  Corporal.  August  1,  1848.  Sergeant,  February  1.  1849,  and  was  Sergeant  Major  of  the  Bat 
talion  of  Engineers  from  February  21,  1807,  to  the  date  of  his  death. 


62 

of  the  whole  company,  under  direction  of  both  officers,  in  Manuel 
du  Sapeur,  together  with  lectures  and  recitations  on  field  fortifica 
tions.  From  11  A.  M.  until  12:30  P.  M.,  [infantry  drill].  From 
2  P.  M.  until  4  P.  M.,  recitations  in  arithmetic  and  practice  in 
writing.  Each  officer  has  a  section  in  arithmetic,  and  gives  a  gen 
eral  superintendence  to  a  section  in  writing.  Instruction  in  writing 
is  given  by  sergeants  ". 

"  I  have  nothing  new  to  offer  either  in  reference  to  the  property, 
the  enlistment  of  men,  or  the  settlement  of  the  accounts  of  the  late 
Captain  Swift.  All,  in  my  opinion,  matters  of  importance ;  but 
already  referred  to,  [in  previous  reports  and  correspondence],  per 
haps,  too  often  ". 

"It  is  just  one  year  since,  by  the  casualties  of  service,  the  com 
mand  of  this  company  devolved  upon  myself  as  the  senior  officer 
for  duty  with  the  engineer  troops.  During  this  time  the  interests 
of  the  general  engineer  service,  particularly  of  the  non-commis 
sioned  officers  and  men,  have  materially  suffered  for  want  of  an 
officer  of  rank  at  the  head  of  the  company.  In  the  French  service 
two  captains  are  assigned  to  every  company  of  this  character,  and 
the  companies  are  all  [well]  instructed  before  they  take  the  field. 
I  earnestly  recommend  that  four  officers  of  engineers  be  assigned 
to  duty  with  this  company.  The  commander  should  be  an  officer 
of  rank  ;  his  position  permanent.  In  case  the  Chief  Engineer 
should  order  an  officer  into  the  field  to  take  command  of  Company 
A,  engineers,  I  respectfully  request  that  I  may  be  ordered  to  the 
United  States  as  soon  as  relieved  from  this  duty  ". 

On  the  1st  of  February,  1848,  I  reported  that  the  course  of  in 
struction,  adopted  for  the  company,  "  had  been  continued,  with 
satisfactory  progress  on  the  part  of  non-commissioned  officers  and 
men  ". 

On  the  27th  of  February,  1848,  in  a  letter  to  Colonel  Totten, 
Chief  Engineer,  Washington,  I).  C.,  transmitting  copies  of  certain 
papers,  I  stated  : 

"I  would  respectfully  refer  you  to  my  communication  of  October 
4th,  1847,  addressed  to  the  then  Adjutant  of  Engineers,  in  which  I 
strongly  urged  that  the  interest  of  the  engineer  service  required 
that  an  officer  and  non-commissioned  officers  should  be  ordered  to 
the  United  States  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  recruits  for  this 
company.  Such  is  the  course  pursued  in  every  other  arm  of  ser 
vice :  and  I  hesitate  not  to  say  that,  had  my  recommendation,  as 
commander  of  the  engineer  company,  been  acted  upon  favorably, 
at  that  time,  we  would  now  have  in  this  city,  a  full  company.  I 
have  referred  often  to  the  wants  of  the  company,  without  favorable 


03 

action  having  been  had  on  my  recommendations.  We  are  not  fur 
nished  with  men,  not  allowed  to  take  the  usual  and,  in  my  opinion, 
necessary  means  of  procuring  recruits.  I  respectfully  request  to  be 
relieved  from  the  command  of  the  engineer  company  without 
further  delay  than  is  necessary  for  the  arrival  of  the  captain  com 
mander  in  this  city  ". 

Owing  to  casualties  of  service,  I  had  almost  continually  com 
manded  the  company,  its  train,  and  the  general  engineer  train  of 
the  army  for  more  than  a  year.  My  rank  was  that  of  Second 
Lieutenant — low  on  that  list.  I  was  conscious  that  my  rank  or 
lack  of  rank,  rather,  was,  in  some  essential  respects,  a  detriment  to 
the  company. 

It  was  believed  that  the  war  was  over;  but,  in  freely  expressing 
willingness  to  give  up  the  command  I  had  long  exercised,  to  which 
I  had  no  claim  based  upon  rank,  I  did  not  hesitate  to  say  that: 
"  If  the  war  should  be  continued,  and  an  additional  company  of  en 
gineer  soldiers  was  authorized  to  be  raised,  thus  creating  an  engineer 
battalion,  I  would  be  more  than  willing  to  command  it  in  the  field: 
provided,  I  was  made  Major,  by  brevet,  and  assigned  to  duty  with 
that  rank  ". 

In  my  official  report  for  the  month  of  March,  1848,  it  is  stated  : 
"  During  the  month,  daily  instruction  [of  the  company]  in  branches 
pertaining  to  engineering  has  been  omitted,  I  have  thought  it 
best  to  pay  more  attention  to  their  improvement  in  writing  and 
arithmetic.  The  infantry  exercises  are  continued  ". 

On  the  1st  of  May,  I  reported  :  "During  the  month  of  April  the 
course  of  instruction  and  drill  pursued  in  March  has  been  con 
tinued,  with  satisfactory  results  ". 

"  Three  privates  of  this  company  have  been  appointed  [by  the 
government  at  Washington]  commissioned  officers.  Three  ser 
geants,  all  men  of  intelligence,  education  and  character,  have 
been  recommended  [by  me],  in  compliance  with  law,  for  commis 
sions;  they  having  all  been  repeatedly  distinguished  for  gallant 
and  high  soldierly  conduct  in  battle.  [As  yet]  none  of  these  ser 
geants  have  received  [appointments]  ". 

When  it  became  generally  known  in  the  army  that  the  Mexican 
Government  had  agreed  to  the  proposed  treaty  of  peace,  and  that 
the  formal  ratification  would  soon  be  consummated,  I  requested  the 
senior  engineer,  Captain  R.  E.  Lee,  to  direct  me  to  sell  the  tools, 
etc.,  of  the  engineer  train,  in  the  city  of  Mexico:  order  me  to  pro 
ceed  to  the  coast  by  the  first  opportunity,  for  the  purpose  of  looking 
up,  and  accounting  for,  a  large  amount  of  engineer  property  for 
which  the  estate  of  the  late  Captain  A.  J.  Swift  was  responsible;  and 


64 

authorize  me  to  turn  over  the  command  of  the  engineer  company  to 
Lieutenant  McClellan,  when  I  started  for  the  coast. 

In  compliance  with  Captain  Lee's  instructions,  the  tools  were  sold. 
They  brought  more  than  they  had  originally  cost  in  the  United 
States.  I  left  the  city  of  Mexico  the  day  the  treaty  of  peace  was 
signed  on  the  part  of  the  Mexicans;  and  accompanied  General 
Persifor  F.  Smith  to  Vera  Cruz,  at  which  place  he  was  charged 
with  making  all  preparations  for  the  transportation  of  the  army  to 
the  United  States.  Before  leaving  the  City  of  Mexico  I  turned  over 
the  command  of  the  engineer  company  to  Lieutenant  McClellan. 
I  was  detained  in  Vera  Cruz  about  two  weeks,  obtaining  informa 
tion  in  regard  to,  and  making  disposition  of,  the  public  property 
in  that  vicinity,  for  which  Captain  Swift's  estate  was  then  held 
responsible. 

The  accounting  officers  of  the  government  in  Washington,  had 
charged  against  him,  on  their  books,  the  value  of  large  amounts  of 
property  which  had  been  shipped  to,  but  never  received  by  him. 
Several  vessels,  partly  loaded  with  portions  of  that  property,  were 
shipwrecked  by  northers  during  the  seige  of  Vera  Cruz.  In  the 
time  I  spent  at  that  place  after  the  war  ended,  I  obtained  knowledge 
which  enabled  me  to  clear  up  all  accounts  against  the  estate  of 
Captain  Swift.  The  amount  of  that  nominal  indebtness  far  ex 
ceeded  the  value  of  his  property;  which  would  have  been  unfairly 
sacrificed  to  the  government,  and  have  left  his  name  unjustly  tar 
nished  as  that  of  a  defaulter,  if  conclusive  evidence  of  the  facts  in 
the  case  had  not  been  furnished  to  the  accounting  officers. 

The  engineer  company,  under  Lieutenant  McClellan,  accom 
panied  by  all  the  engineer  officers  from  the  City  of  Mexico,  left 
that  city  on  the  28th  of  May,  1848,  and  marched  to  Vera  Cruz. 
From  the  latter  place  the  company  was  transported  by  steamer  to 
New  York  City ;  arrived  at  West  Point,  N.  Y.,  on  the  22nd  of  June; 
reported  to  the  superintendent  of  the  Military  Academy,  and  was 
immediately  ordered  to  report  to  Captain  George  W.  Cullum,  of  the 
engineer  corps,  as  its  new  commander.  I  remained  about  a  week 
in  Vera  Cruz  after  the  company  sailed  ;  arrived  at  West  Point  in 
July ;  and  was  ordered  to  report  to  Captain  Cullum. 

A  short  time  thereafter,  I  asked  to  be  relieved  from  duty  with 
the  company ;  and  applied  for  six  months  leave  of  absence.  The 
leave  was  granted,  and  it  was  understood  that,  on  its  expiration,  I 
would  be  ordered  to  other  engineer  service. 

Before  the  expiration  of  my  leave,  the  war  men  of  the  company 
procured  the  passage  of  an  act  by  Congress,  authorizing  their  dis 
charge  from  the  service.  Under  that  act  nearly  all  the  men  of 


05 

the  company,  who  had  served  in  Mexico,  immediately  obtained 
their  discharge  from  the  army.  This  virtually  reduced  the  company 
to  the  detachment  of  recruits  which  had  been  collected  and  re 
tained  at  West  Point. 

At  the  expiration  of  my  leave  of  absence  I  was  formally  relieved 
from  further  direct  service  with  the  engineer  company;  and  at  the 
request  of  the  Chief  Engineer,  consented  to  undertake  the  enlist 
ment  of  new  recruits  to  fill  the  places  in  the  company  vacated  by 
the  war  men,  who  had  been  discharged.  That  business  was 
finished  within  a  few  months.  I  was  then  ordered  on  other  en 
gineer  duty  and,  thus,  my  connection  with  the  engineer  company 
ended. 


APPENDIX  A. 

BRIEF  EXTRACTS,    FROM   WILCOX'S  HISTORY  OF  THE 
MEXICAN  WAR,    1892. 


"  General  Patterson  was  ordered  to  march  [December,  1846,]  from 
Matamoros  to  Victoria  with  three  regiments  of  volunteers,  two 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  the  engineer  company  under  Lieut.  G.  W. 
Smith  ".  (p.  187.) 

VERA  CRUZ.  "  This  line  of  investment,  through  the  chapparal 
and  over  the  sand  hills,  was  located  by  Lieut.  G.  W.  Smith,  of  the 
engineers,  assisted  by  Lieut.  G.  B.  McClellan,  and  a  roadway  along 
the  line  was  made  under  the  supervision  of  these  two  lieutenants 
with  the  engineer  company  and  a  party  of  several  hundred  sol 
diers  ".  (p.  246.) 

CERRO  GORDO.  "  On  the  arrival  of  the  engineer  company  and 
train  at  Plan  del  Rio  [April  17th,  1847],  Lieut.  G.  B.  McClellan 
with  a  party  of  ten  men  reported  to  General  Pillow,  and,  Lieut. 
G.  W.  Smith  with  [the  rest  of]  his  men  and  a  portion  of  the  train 
to  General  Twiggs  ". 

"That  night  [17th]  one  24-pounder  and  two  24-pound  howitzers 
were  placed  in  position  on  the  Atalaya,  the  battery  being  con 
structed  under  the  supervision  of  Lieut.  G.  W.  Smith,  assisted  by 
Lieut.  John  G.  Foster  of  the  engineers,  the  location  of  the  battery 
having  been  determined  by  Capt.  R.  E.  Lee  ".  (p.  286.) 

FROM  PUEBLA  TO  THE  VALLEY  OF  MEXICO.  "  Riley's  brigade 
was  guided  by  Capt.  Lee,  assisted  by  Lieut.  John  G.  Foster  with 
ten  men  of  the  engineer  company  ".  (p.  287-8.) 

"  It  was  the  rule  with  General  Scott  that  one  of  the  only  two 
regular  divisions  should  always  be  in  front,  The  engineer  com 
pany  headed  the  column.  There  was  but  one  company  of  engineer 
soldiers  in  the  United  States  army  ".  (p.  339.) 

IN  THE  VALLEY  OF  MKXICO.  "Beyond  San  Gregorio,  the  bor 
der  of  Xochimilco  was  skirted,  and  here  obstructions  in  the  road 
were  first  encountered,  a  ditch  having  been  dug  across  it,  and  large 

(66) 


C7 

stones  rolled  down  from  the  hillside;  but  these  obstacles  were  soon 
overcome  by  the  engineer  company  with  a  detail  from  the  leading 
brigade,  while  the  Mexicans,  who  were  firing  from  the  heights 
above,  were  driven  off  by  Colonel  C.  F.  Smith's  light  battalion  ". 
( p.  355.) 

CONTRERAS.  "  The  engineer  company  was  recalled  from  Worth, 
and  with  a  working  party  of  500  men,  was  ordered  to  make  the 
road  to  Padierna  practicable  for  artillery  ".  ( p.  362.) 

"  When  Smith's  brigade  advanced  as  described,  the  engineer 
company,  under  Lieut.  G.  W.  Smith,  went  into  action  with  the 
Third  Infantry  of  that  brigade  ".  (  p.  363.) 

"  General  Smith  moved  to  his  right  and  front  across  ihepedrigal, 
the  Rifles,  with  the  engineer  company  at  their  head,  leading". 

"  At  2:30  A.  M.  of  the  20th  [August,  1847],  the  troops  under  Gen 
eral  Smith  began  to  form  and  take  their  places  preparatory  to  the 
march  which  would  bring  them  on  Valencia's  rear.  Leading  the 
Rifles  in  front  of  the  brigade  was  the  engineer  company  ".  (p.  369.) 

"  The  engineer  company  and  the  Rifles,  being  already  in  position 
in  rear  of  the  Mexican  detachment,  then  rose  and  firing  a  volley 
upon  it,  and  Riley  continuing  on  upon  them,  they  faced  about, 
broke,  and  fled  in  the  utmost  precipitation  to  the  main  line  in 
rear,  pursued  by  Riley,  the  Rifles  and  engineer  company  ".  (p.  70.) 

ChuRUBUSCO.  "  At  Coyoacan  General  Scott  joined,  having  pre 
viously  ordered  his  columns  to  halt  there.  Lieut.  I.  I.  Stevens, 
ordered  about  the  same  time  to  advance  on  the  direct  road  and 
reconnoitre,  was  supported  by  the  engineer  company  under  Lieut. 
G.  W.  Smith.  This  reconnaissance  covered  the  Convent  of  San 
Pablo  in  the  village  of  Churubusco  ".  (p.  378-9.) 

CHAPULTEPEC.  "  Battery  No.  1  was  constructed  under  Lieut. 
G.  W.  Smith's  supervision,  and  Battery  No.  2  under  Lieut.  G.  B. 
McClellan's.  Details  were  made  from  Quitman's  division  to  assist 
the  engineer  company  in  the  construction  of  these  works,  but  al 
though  directed  to  report  immediately  after  dark  they  did  not  arrive 
until  near  4  A.  M.,  of  the  12th  ;  hence  these  works,  which  were  to 
have  been  finished  before  daylight,  were  hardly  commenced  by  that 
time.  The  engineers  were  however,  indefatigable,  and  the  batteries 
were  completed  rapidly  ".  ( p.  452.) 

CITY  OF  MEXICO.  "  Lieut.  G.  W.  Smith,  with  the  company  and 
train  under  his  command,  reported  to  General  Worth  on  the  [San 
Cosme]  causeway,  [in  the  afternoon,  September  13th],  was  in 
formed  that  the  wounding  of  Lieut.  Stevens  made  him  [Smith]  the 
senior  engineer  of  the  attack  then  going  on,  and  was  instructed  to 
go  to  the  front,  closely  and  carefully  examine  the  state  of  affairs, 


68 

return  as  soon  as  practicable,  and  report  the  best  method  of  con 
ducting  the  attack  ".  He  reported  "  that  infantry  alone  on  the  left 
of  the  road  could  capture  the  gate,  without  artillery  and  with 
little  loss,  by  making  its  way  through  the  houses.  He  was  ordered 
to  take  the  engineer  company  and  tools,  return  to  the  front,  and 
carry  out  the  plan  proposed  ".  ( p.  476.) 

"The  Mexicans  did  not  remain  long  in  front  of  Worth;  after  dark 
the  signal  for  retreat  of  one  command  was  given,  and  being  heard 
by  all,  they  left  the  buildings  and  scattered  in  all  directions,  their 
officers  being  unable  to  restrain  them.  In  a  little  while,  however, 
they  repaired  to  the  citadel.  In  one  of  the  pavilions  a  council  was 
held.  Santa  Anna  presided,  explained  the  untoward  incidents  of 
the  day,  and  asked  the  opinions  of  those  present  as  to  whether  or 
not  the  defence  of  the  capital  should  be  prolonged.  There  was 
discussion  and  opposition,  but,  Santa  Anna  announced  his  decision 
in  these  emphatic  words  :  '  I  resolve  that  this  night  this  city  must 
be  evacuated'".  (  p.  480-1.) 

"  At  1  o'clock  A.  M.  of  the  14th  commissioners  from  the  muni 
cipal  government  of  the  city  approached  the  advanced  post  of 
Worth's  command,  were  passed  to  his  headquarters,  and  by  him 
sent  to  General  Scott's  headquarters  in  Tacubaya".  (  p.  481.) 

"General  Worth  then  directed  the  two  engineer  officers,  serving 
with  his  command,  to  proceed  to  the  front  and  with  a  detachment 
of  infantry  and  the  engineer  company,  closely  examine  all  strong 
buildings,  and  direct  operations  toward  the  Main  Plaza  and 
National  Palace.  The  senior  engineer  being  directed  to  make 
known  promptly  any  indication  that  the  rumored  evacuation  was 
incorrect,  reported  that  everything  indicated  that  the  Mexican 
army  had  abandoned  the  city",  (p.  481.) 


APPENDIX  B. 

PROMOTIONS   OF   ENLISTED   MEN   OF   THE   COMPANY. 


TEPE  AGUALCO,  MEXICO, 

May  4,  1847. 
Colonel  JOSEPH  G.  TOTTEN, 

Chief  Engineer, 

Washington  City. 
SIR: 

"  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that,  on  the  25th  of  April, 
First  Sergeant  Hastings  of  l  K '  Company,  Third  Artillery,  was, 
by  order  of  General  Worth,  transferred  to  the  Engineer  Corps,  sub 
ject  to  the  approval  of  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

"  Sergeant  Hastings  has  the  reputation  of  being  one  of  the  best 
first  sergeants  in  the  army.  He  was  for  7  or  8  years  orderly  ser 
geant  in  the  Second  Infantry.  He  is  an  intimate  friend  of  Sergeant 
Everett;*  is  a  well  educated  man,  very  intelligent;  a  remarkably 
fine  looking  soldier,  a  good  drill  sergeant. 

"By  birth  he  is  an  Irishman— he  came  to  this  country  quite 
young,  and  was  brought  up  in  Po'keepsie,  N.  Y. 

"  We  were  very  much  in  want  of  an  orderly  sergeant.  I  think 
there  can  be  no  doubt  but  we  have  secured  a. prize. 

"  I  would  be  glad  if  you  would  send  a  Sergeant's  warrant  for 
David  H.  Hastings.  I  respectfully  recommend  the  following  pro 
motions  and  appointments  in  the  engineer  company: 

Corporal  Benjamin  W.  Coit,  acting  lance  sergeant  since  1st  of 
February,  to  be  sergeant  from  February  1st,  1847 : 

Artificer  Charles  A.  Viregg,  lance  corporal  since  1st  of  February ? 
to  be  corporal  from  February  1st,  1847: 

Artificer  Ethan  T.  Sheldon,  lance  corporal  since  1st  of  February, 
to  be  corporal  from  February  1st,  1847: 

*  Thornton  S.  Everett  was  property  sergeant  of  the  engineer  company;  had  charge  of  its 
train  from  the  time  of  his  enlistment  in  the  company  until  its  return  to  West  Point;  and,  in 
addition,  had  charge,  in  Mexico,  of  the  general  engineer  train  of  the  army. 

(69) 


70 

Artificer  William  A.  Noyes,  to  be  corporal  from  the  18th  of 
April,  1847; 

"Privates  Charles  A.  Pierce,  Jacob  T.  Smith,  Benjamin  L.  Boomer, 
Edwin  M.  Holloway,  James  Brannan,  Joseph  A.  Mower,  David  P. 
Weaver,  Thomas  Bigley,  Seth  H.  Taylor,  and  Charles  A.  Porter, 
to  be  artificers  from  the  29th  of  March,  1847  : 

"Musician  Frederick  W.  Gerber  to  be  artificer  from  the  18th  of 
April,  1847 : 

"Privates  Augustus  B.  Hussey,  James  B.  Vansant,  and  William 
S.  Bliss,  to  be  artificers  from  the  29th  of  March,  1847: 

"  Corporal  William  Bartlett,  reduced  to  the  grade  of  artificer, 
May  1st,  1847 : 

"  Artificer  Hiram  B.  Yeager  to  be  corporal  from  May  1st,  1847: 

"  Artificer  Charles  W.  Bont  reduced  to  the  grade  of  second  class 
private  from  May  1st,  1847: 

"  I  respectfully  call  to  the  attention  of  the  Chief  Engineer  the 
fact  that,  in  accordance  with  his  suggestion,  I  have  delayed  making 
the  above  recommendations,  and  now  urge  them  as  my  deliberate 
opinion.  I  hope  they  will  be  favorably  acted  upon. 

"My  monthly  return  for  April  shows  a  total  of  sixty-two.  My 
recommendations  make,  in  the  company,  six  sergeants,  six  cor 
porals,  one  musician,  twenty-three  artificers  and  twenty-six  second 
class  privates". 

Very  respectfully, 

Your  obdt.  servt., 
*  GUS.  W.  SMITH, 

Lieut.,  Comdg.  Engr.  Co. 

The  foregoing  recommendations  were  approved  and  the  appoint 
ments  were  received  whilst  the  company  was  in  the  city  of  Puebla. 

Soon  after  the  war  ended,  Sergeants  Hastings,  Starr  and  Everett 
were  promoted  to  be  commissioned  officers  in  the  "  Old  Regular 
Army  "  of  the  United  States.  Later,  Sergeant  Warren  L.  Lothrop 
was  given  a  commission  in  that  army. 


